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CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION 1 AYRES 1 THE SOCIAL THEORIST 
The writer first became interested in the social theor,y of Clarence 
Edwin Ayres while working on papers in sociological theory and social 
stratification at the University of the Pacific. In studying the theories 
of Thorstein Veblen and Leslie A. White, it was found that an underlying 
similarity existed among these writers and Clarence E. Ayres. The main 
thread of similarity was the prominence given to technology as _the prime 
. 1 
engine of change •. 
Other sociologists and anthropologists had made technological and 
economic factors basic to their social theory, and several in addition had 
emphasized these factors in varying degrees. These included: William F •. 
Ogburn, F. s. Chapin, Harry Elmer Barnes, George Peter Murdock, John R. 
. 2 Connnons, Albert Galloway Keller, and Howard w. Odum. Yet, it seemed that 
Ayres's position was equally as well formulated, but he was never mentioned 
as being an exponent of this position. 
1Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class: !!! economic studz 
2f institutions, (New York: The Modern Library, 1934); Leslie A. White, 
~Evolution of Culture, (New York1 McGraw Hill, 1959). 
2william Fielding Ogburn, Social Change :!!.tt:!! ResEect to Culture !.!!!! 
Original Nature (New York: The Viking Press, 1950); F. s. Chapin, Cultural 
Change (New York: The Century Co., 1928); Harry Elmer Barnes, Sociology and 
Political Theo!:X (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1924); Geor€!e Peter Hurdock, · 
Social Structure (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949); John R. Commons, 
The Economics of Collective Action (New York: The ~acmillan Co., 1950)t 
Albert GallowayKeller, Societal Evolution (New York: The Macmillan Co., 
1915); Howard W, Odum, Man's Quest for Social Guidance (New York: Henry 
Holt and Co., 1927). -
!-i 
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Why was Ayres omitted? It may very "'oTell have been that Ayres's position 
as a social theorist was in doubt because he wrote primarily as an economist. 
Ayres had come to the study of economics by a circuitous route which involved 
first the study of philosophy and later the. acceptance of teaching positions 
in the field of econoroics,3 Ayres had written his Ph.D. dissertation at the 
University of Chicago in Philosophy (1917). But even in his early writings, 
he showed interest in the thought of Thorstein Veblen, who along with John 
Dewey, were to become his mentors. It was from Veblen that Ayres had come to· 
see that the patterns of human b~havior and social behavior had two fundamental 
thrusts, not merely rational and emot~onal, as psychologists were prone to 
point out, but the "workmanship" of man by which Veblen meant technology and 
institutional behavior patterned upon ceremony, status, and tradition. Veblen used 
many terms to describe this latter behavior, such as, "waste, 11 "pecuniary 
employments," and "imbecility," btit its main characteristic was ceremony and 
ritual. There was a basic irrationality in man and a great procli-vity on his 
part for display and ceremony, Ayres s'il:mmarized Veblen's .·contribution 
succinctly when toward the end of his life he published a new introduction 
3Biographical sketch on Ayres: Jacques Cattell, Director~ of American 
Scholars, Second Edition, 1951, pp. 32-33: "Born Lowell, Mass, May 6, 1891. 
A. B. Brown, 1912, A.N. 1914; Harvard 1913; fellow Chicago, 1916-1917, Ph.D. 
1917. Instructor Philosophy, Chicago, 1917-1920, Assoc. Prof. Amherst College 
1920-1923; Prof. Reed College, 1923-1924; Assoc. Editor~~ Republic, 1924-
1925; lecturer in Philosophy and adviser experimental college, Wisconsin, 
1928-1929; Prof. Econ., TeXas, 1930. Director of Consumer Division, u.s. 
Dept. of Labor, 1936; Visiting Professor of Washington (Seattle), 1940; 
Summersa Prof. Ohio State, 1927; New York Urdversity, 1930. Philosophical 
Association, Economic Association (Board of Editors, American Economic 
Review, 1935-1937); s.w.s. Science Asso~iation, (pres., 1939), Social 
Philosophy, Economic Theory and its history; institutional economics. 11 
Ayres died in 1972. 
,...,. 
h- -------·- --- -
to two of his earlier works& Sciences The False Messiah (1927) and Holier 
Than~ (1929). He wrote a 
It is now generally understood that human behavior--all human 
behavior and all organized social patterns--present two distinct 
and contrasting.(though not unrelated) aspects to the uninvolved 
observer. From the earliest times of which we have knowledge, 
down to the present human behavior presents an amazing contrast 
, __ _ 
~­
g~-~= 
ri --
L.:_~-----~-
il-------=o=-cf:_·-=·l·_:ca--=t=i=o=n=al~i==ty and irra tionali_tJ"-,_Of_:_s_ens_e_and_nonsense-.-of'.~----------o-------
economy and waste. This contrast was Veblen's master principle. 
As the contrast between "making things" and "making money" it 
was the master principle of his economics and rarhaps his 
significant contribution to the dismal science. . . · 
Don Martindale once wrote about Veblen in the_ following manner& 
The reason why Veblen's theoretical importance tended to be 
obscured was the general sociological rather than specifically 
economic nature of his theories. Economists thought of his 
work as tangential to the main business of economics. And as 
long as sociologists·have treated him as an economist, they 
have not--and fraquently still do not look at Veblen's work 
as a type of sociological theory. Hence one of America's most 
original theorists is at times denied recognition as a theorist•S 
-What Martindale intimates is that social theory does not have to come from 
professors of Sociology to be germane. _It should be judged on its own merit 
and is not the monopoly of sociologists. It is authenticated by its usage 
as a model or by recognition of its analytical depth. 
It seemed to this writer that Ayres's sociological thought deserved 
credit, if for no other reason, than it was obvious that he clarified in 
great measure the positions of Thorstein Veblen and John Dewey. But there 
were other reasons as well. 
4c1arence E. Ayres, Science' The False Messiah (1927; rpt. Clifton, N.J.a 
Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1973);-aolier Than Tho~ (1929; rpt. Clifton, 
N .J .a Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1973). ,p.-fV.- · 
5non Martindale, _The Nature~ !;vPes of §oci.<:>logical ~. (Bostons 
Houghton Hifflin Company ~T§6o), p. 399. 
4 
C. Wright Hills, who had been a student of Ayres while attending the 
Univeristy of Texas in the 1930s, had praised Ayres's understanding of 
Veblen. ·He believed Ayres to be the foremost interpreter of Veblen. 6 Mills 
went on to become one of the leading sociologists in the United States. He 
taught Sociology at Columbia University from 1946 until 1962. He was an 
exponent of interactionism, and some have labeled him as the foremost 
representative of the conflict model of sociological theory in the United 
States. 7 Talcott Parsons, one of the leading exponents of the other basic 
sociological orientation in the United States, the structural functionalist · 
model, was also a student of Ayres while at Amherst, at the end of World. 
War I. Ayres seemed qu.i.te oblivious to the influence he had upon their 
thought. According to Gillam, there were great feuds between Mills and 
Parsons over different sociological perspectives, and yet it is impossible 
to .know how much of their perspective was gained from Ayres. 8 One of Ayres's 
former students commented along these linesa "That two outstanding students 
of A::fres could represent such divergence of approach may indicate a certain 
confusion or ambiguity in his thought or at least in his classroom presenta-
tion. "9 But a careful reading of both Mills. and Parsons does reveal some 
6c, Wright Mills, Images of Man (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 
1960), p. 336, n. 1. 
71-lilliam A. Kolb. "Sociology and the Christian Doctrine of Man, II in 
Religion and ContemE_orary Western Culture, ed., Edward Cell (New Yorka 
Abingdon Press, 1967), p~ 365a Leonard Broom and Phillip Selznick, 
Sociolo~, Fifth Edition (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1973), 
p. 6; Martindale, p. 373. 
~icha.rd Gillam, "The Intellectual Rebela C. Wright Mills, 1914-1946," 
(Unpubl. M.A. Thesis, Columbia University, 1966), p. 40. 
9Rick Tilman, 11 Value Theory, Planning and Reform a Ayres as Incrementalist 
and Utopian,•• Journal of Economic Issues, VIII, (December, 1974), p. 706., 
n. 23. - - - · · 
- --- -------
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similarities to Ayres's thought, and it should be remembered that Mills and 
Parsons by no means present totally consistent systems. 
Walter Rochs Goldschmidt, Professor of AnthropOlogy, at the University 
of California, dedicated his book, Man • s Wa:v.: !. _E!:eface to ~ understanding. __ 
10 
of human society to Ayres and others who were his teachers, among them 
~:-~--
"::I __ 
-----~--- ---~ 
Alfred L. Kroeber and Robert H. Lowie. While Go_ldschmidt_d_o_e_s_no_t_citft._____c__ _______ _ 
Ayres specifically in the text, it is obvious that he shows great indebtedness 
to him in chapters four and five where technology is discussed. Ayres also 
taught Marion L. Levy, who is Professor of Sociology at Princeton University, 
as .well as David Hamilton, who is Professor of Economics at New :Hexico 
University. There are probably m~ other students whom Ayres taught in the 
ranks of sociology teachers who are unknown to the wr-iter, but if this were 
all, it would indicate considerable influence. 
It is the thesis of this study, that although Ayres's theory of progress 
is damaging to his sociological theory as a whole, his theory of the basic 
dichotomy of social action; that of technology and ceremonialism, deserves 
greater credit than it has received and is profoundly significant sociologically. 
It is obvious to anyone who has ever read through the works of Clarence 
Ayres that he was a man of many interests. He was interested in anthropology, 
psychology, history, the humanities, and the arts. How do you place individuals in 
categories who show such a versatile depth in human thought? A former ~' 
student has commenteda "A reader unfamiliar with the work of Clarence Ayres, 
taking a casual glance at his writing, easily could mistake him for art 
10vTalter Rochs Goldschmidt, Man's ~aye !. pref!!£.~ to~ underst8!ldin,g 
of' human .~E,~:_ie.~z, (New Yorke The World Publishing Company, 19.59). . 
6 
historian, musicologist, philosopher, or literary critic. His published 
work; written over a period of nearly sixty years, reveals encyclopedic 
knowledge and an ·incredibly broad range of interests.1•11 
Ayres seemed to have had an interest in psychoanalysis as a tool for 
solving human behavior problems. He taught Allen \iheelis, a practicing 
psychiatrist and psychoanalyst in the San Francisco B~ area, while he was 
a student at the University of Texas, and Wheelis has written a book which 
deals in large part with Ayres's "technological" and ''institutional" 
concepts. 12 
It should be stated quite clearly that Ayres never failed to give 
credit to Thorstein Veblen and John Dewey for their contribution to his 
germinal ideas about the basic dichoto~ in human social behavior. His 
. 13 last published writing, 111hich was referred to above, was a new introduction 
to his older works z Science: .!h! False Messiah and Holier Than Thou. This 
introduction was written at the insistence of Joseph Dorfman of Columbia 
.. 
University, another first-rate Veblenian scholar. Dorfman was an avid 
admirer of Ayres's interpretation of Veblen's theory and requested that 
Ayres write a new introduction to these two older works explaining how 
Veblen's ideas were manifested in them • 
. 
11Tilman, P• ~9. 
12n1en ·Wheelis, The Quest for Identity, (New York: W. W. Norton and • 
Co., Inc~, 1958), especially pp. 174-205, 
13see Page 3 Above, 
?- --- -
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In this new introduction, Ayres revealed some of his own development 
. . 
in thought. He stated that he had early been aware of human behaVior as a 
dichotomy, but that he bad failed in these two works to identify the two 
aspects of human behavior as a ''dichotomy." Veblen had never used the term 
as such, although dichotomies abounded throughout hiS writings. Ayres 
Gospel. of Technology" article to be included in American Philos~ Toda;r 
and Tomorrow, edited by Horace M. Kallen and Sidney Hook. 14 This article was . 
first published in 193.5. Ayres stated that "Veblen made the dichotoli\Y 
of technology and ceremonialism his-master principler and in my later 
efforts to clarify the 'Institutional Conception' of economic process and 
economic policy I have followed his lead. 111.5 But Ayres went on to admit 
that he was astonished that he had not clearly used the term "dichotomy" 
earlier than 1932. He reflecteda 
I am mildly astonished to find that Science: The False Messiah 
is concerned With one aspect of human nature ··aiid_ 'or all organized· 
society, and Holier Than Thou with the other. Neither is so 
identified, this I do not'"""Uilderstand. For I was already an 
, av01..red Veblenian, and would not have hesitated to identify my 
ideas with· hj.s. But perhaps the explanation of this anomaly 
is simply that at this time my ideas were too inchoate to be 
identified even tg my own mind with the dichotomy which later 
seemed so clear. · · 
14clarence Edwin Ayres, "The Gospel of Technology," in .American Philosophy 
Today and Tomorrow, eds., Horace M. Kallen and Sidriey Hook,· (1935J rpt. 
Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1968), pp. 2.5-42, · 
1.5Ayres, Hessiah, p. v. 
16Ibid. 
- ------------
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It. was John Dewey, Ayres said, who influenced him most on his theory 
of value. Ayres originally taunted his older professors about their 
insistence upon maintaining some type of value scheme in the period when 
value-relativism was taking hold. "Darwinism" had exploded all such notions 
of certainty or design. Adam Smith's belief, that a "guiding hand'' led 
men through self-interest toward an end which no one had in mind, that 
·is the common good,17 was an attempt to ordain "nature" with adesign that 
had been lost in the demise of supernaturalism. But while Ayres originaJ..ly· 
espoused the new "cultural relativism," he was not entirely happy with it. 
He admitted that even in Holier Than Thou this . displeasure was partially 
--
visible. It was revealed with his displeasure of Sumner's dualistic 
·"folkways" and "mores." He did not appreciate the dualistic implications 
of one's being higher than the other. 
Mores were moral sanctions for Sumner and therefore essential for 
usage in a particular cultural setting. Folkways were not binding and 
were more akin to etiquette. Ayres questioned the advisability of Sumner's 
division, .since both were basically customs. How can you make one higher 
than the other and be consistent to Sumner's theory that custom makes 
anything right? Ayres's reasoning was 
The theory of Folkways seems to be that morals as well as 
etiquette are only customs. But there is another way in which 
this theory can be taken. We assume that conventions are 
trivial because they are customary. And therefore we assu.me 
further if morals are customary too, they are also trivial. 
·But if we begin at the other end, assume that morals are of 
17c. E. Ayres, Toward a Reasonable Society, ( Austin, Texas: University 
of Texas Press, 19bl), p.-7. 
ri ----
---------------
greatest possible importance, and that they are customary, and 
then move to the proposition that folkways are customary too, 
there is no reason at all for our concluding that the folkways 
are trivial because they are customary. On the contrary, 
reasoning in that direction we should properly make the 
inference that, folkways being customary in the same sense as 
mores, they are just as important if not just as sacred as the 
mores. Indeed, Sumner's distinction between the two if8made entirely on ground of popular prejudice in the matter. 
9 
Veblen too, earlier than Sumner and more capably according to ~es, 
had espoused folkways as the onl~ guides to behavior. But Ayres believed 
the relativism of Veblen to have been essentially different from that of 
Sumner in that Veblen was conscious. of the life-process as bej.ng dependent 
upon tool-behavior and basically for "the good of the species." He noted 
that Veblen was aware, in a way that Sumner was not, of human life as a 
locus of value through "workmanship." He stated': "Veblen saw this. As 
I have suggested even when he is intent upon pointing out the utter 
conventionality of 'waste,• ho says in effect that human life and well 
being is a quite differentmatter,"19 The difference between Sumner am 
Veblen was that Sumner understood customs as the locus of value· whU.e 
Veblen understood human needs as the locus of value.~ 
Ayres admitted that he was a ~•moral agnostic" until he encountered 
John Dewey's Theory of Valuation. Previously, he urged his colleagues to 
"come clean" and admit that there were no "guiding rules" to establishing 
values, one custom being as significant as any other. . He was heading for 
. .· . 
a volta-face, but originally he denounced the hypocricy of value preference: 
18Ayres, Holi~, pp. 49-50. 
19Ayres, Messiah, p. x, 
~ ~~~- ------ -
-------~~~ 
10 
"If value judgments give effect to tribal practices ~ nothing else, then 
there are no absolute values, What we think good and right is what our 
community values,· As human life is organized it can be nothing more, There 
are no transcultural values."20 
A change of attitude occurred, however, with his understanding of John 
Dewey's Theorz of Valuation. He said that he was awakened from his dogmatic 
slumber and to. a new understanding of how valuation does occur in the human 
species, not through dictates of custom but rather through the need for 
. . 
man to find answers to the basic problems of life, for example, health, 
survival, cooperation, tools, conservation, workmanship, and the other 
necessities of the making of life. In this developnent, Ayres can be seen 
as standing in the h1xmanistic tradition of some current sociologists, such 
as C. Wright Hills, Irving Louis Horowitz, Alvin Gouldner, Norman Birnbaum, 
Seymour Lipset, Daniel Bell, Robin M. Williams, Jr., and Robert Nisbet to 
name but a few. 21 He stateda 
• , • To be sure nothing mitigates the obscurantism of 
"imbecile" institutions. But institutional archaism is 
not .the whole of life. There is always the technological 
process, and the continuity of that process means that it 
is a locus of value no less definite than institutional 
taboos. The technological process is what Dewey called 
"a means-ends continum." Human life itself is tho "locus" 
of value--not in the animistic sense of totem and taboo 
but in the continuously pro~~ssi ve sense of the "instinct" 
(or process) of workmanship. 
20Ibid. 
21Donald A. Hansen, An Invitation ~ Critical Sociolo&, (New York& 
The Free Press, 1976), p. xiii. 
22Ayres, Messiah, p. x. 
~ 
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\'ihat Dewey accom:plishod then was to put back into the vacuum of "moral 
agnosticism," not transcendental values, or historical order, or natural 
meanings which were imposed upon the world but rather a means of evaluation, 
a process of judging. It was never a.certainty; it was always experimental. 
But it was a tool that could be used to solve one problem before moving on 
to other problems. Dewey made the following comments on this matters 
••• No human activity operates in a vacuum; it acts in the 
world and has materials upon which and through which it 
produces results. On the other hand, no material--air, water, 
metal, wood, etc.--is means save as it is employed in some 
human activity to accomplish something. When "organization . 
of activities" is mentioned, it always includes within itself 
organization of the materials existing in the world in which 
we live. That organization which is the "final" value for 
each concrete situation of valuation thus forms part of the 
existantial conditions that have to be taken into account 1n23 further formation of desires and interests or valuations. • • . 
Gruchy states the following concerning Ayres's reliance upon Dewey: 
• • • p..'-lilosophel:'S, going back to Plato and Aristotle and 
continuing up to the advent of John Dewey's philosophy of 
pragmatism around 1900, had a dualistic approach to the 
study of reality. They separated human experience or the 
actual daily round of events from-what was aileged to be a 
more uniform and ultimate scheme of things lying behind the 
flux of actual events. The behind-the-scenes scheme of things 
was asserted to be perfect, changeless and the reflection of 
some Ultimate Reason or eternal spirit. This classicai 
philosophical approach takes society to be fundamentally 
chru1geless and static. There is no inner spring or factor 
at work in the world which is an independent source of 
dynamic change, and which would, if it existed, necessarily 
push the world along an evolutionar,y path. According to 
the interpretation of classical philosophers science or 
knowledge accumulates. but daes not change the underlying 
essential order of things,2 • . · · 
23John Dewey, Theory of Valuati.on, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1939), P• 50. 
24Allan G. Gruchy, fontempora.~ Econo~.£ Th~, (Clifton, N. J.: 
Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1972), PP• 90··91. 
~---
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Gruchy elaborates further upon AJTes's development of dichotomous relationships 
as the essence of the life-situation in the following statementa 
Ayres, like John Dewey, has made a major break from 
classical ninateenth century philosophy. Following Dewey, 
Ayres has abandoned the dualism·that runs through standard 
philosophy. Dewey takes society to be a life process in 
n--- ---
---------------
which there is rio such thing as a dualism between what is 
seen and what is behind the scenes. There is no changeless, 
static or orderly process behind the. life process of mankh1d. 
~--------~Tho-~~fe-proee5s~i~us~rrat-±t-is--people-~th=e~p=r=o~c~e~s~s--~------------------
of acting, experimenting, accumulating scientific knowledge 
and altering the actual scheme of things with the aim of 
improving ·social well-being. All is unity. Biologically 
mind and body are inseparable, and lifewise, from the 
pragmatic philosophical point of new, there is no 
separation between what is mental and what is material.25 
Ayres never lost sight of the ·fact that Dewey paved the way for him 
to see clearly the institutionalism of Veblen and the technological efforts ·' 
of man (the "workmanship" of Veblen and the "instrumentalism" of Dewey), 
but he never really doubted that the conceptual framework would.have 
·eventually been understood by him, even without them, for the "process" 
was greater than any individual "originator". He sta.teda. 
. . . . .· 
Ny own ideas have been chieny formed, so far as I can judge, 
by reflection upon the work of John Dewey and Thorstein Veblen; 
but the importance of such men derives not from personal 
authority nor even from any notable originality, but rather 
from the clarity with which they have served as mouthpieces 
for the culture they express. What they have voiced is 
important, it seems to me, because it is obvious and manda-
tory. Thus I regard Dewey's "instrw11ental" philosophy and 
the "institutional" economics which derives from Veblen· 
(though he did not christen it) as almost identical expressions 
of an a~gst ine~-i table trend's the trend of technology and 
science. . 
Z5Ibid., P• 92. 
26Ayres, Gos:pel, P• 27. · 
13 
Th1.s writer has proposed as a part of his thesis for this study of· 
Ayres's social thought that C. E. Ayres developed the thought of both 
Veblen and Dewey beyond their original points of reference to a new social 
theory, the theory of the dichotomy of technology and institutionalism. 
While Veblen did not have a chance to know of Ayres's progression along 
these lines, Dewey did, and once stateda 
...j ___ -
~­
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• • • while a numb l"_Of writ~rs_haye_bro_ught_f'o~a~d_the_fact!'l: _____ ~--~---
which are involved in this view {Instrumentalism), Dr. Clarence 
Ayres, as far as I . am aware was the first one explicitly to · 
call science a mode of technology, It is probable that I 
might have avoided a considerable amount of misunderstanding 
if I had systematically used "technolocy" instead of 
"instrumentalism" in connection with the view I pUt forth · 
regarding the distinctive quality of science of lmowledge. 27 
Although Ayres himself later remarked that the term "technolo€r.V" also had 
its limitations, the search for a term of greater pertinence seemed 
fru:i.tless. 28 
It is obviously impossible in the light of the extensive nature of 
Clarence Ayres's works to cover them in detail. Certainly, this writer . 
realizes that he is not competent to judge A:fres 's economic thought. 
. . 
It is then to the ·social thought of .Ayres that this study will be directed. 
Since Ayres is constantly referring to the development of "man," we shall not 
substitute "human species," a reference he occasionally used, but will only 
make clear that ''man" is used in this study generically. 
27John Dewey, Problems £f Men, (New Yorkr 
p. 291 n. 
Philosophical Libraey, 1946) , 
28Ayres, Society, p. 277. 
14 
The attempt in Chapter Two will be to show how Ayres developed in his 
understanding of human n~ture and to show how he observed the self as a 
complex-biological, socia~ and symbolic (cultural). In Chapter Three, the 
attempt will be to present Ayres's views on the basic dichotom,y which made 
up his sociological framework, the "Institutional" and "Technolo~ical" 
framework. Here some contributing factors to his development will be 
considered, but emphasis will be placed upon Ayres's unique contribution. 
In Chapter Four, emphasis will be given to a summary of Ayres's development 
of his most controversial theoryl the theory of technological progress 
which includes his theory of value. Finally, in Chapter Five, the 
conclusion and critique will be presented and the thesis summarized. 
L' 
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CHAPI'FR 'IWO, THE NATURE OF THE SELF IN AYRES'S THOUGHT a 
BIOLOGICAL, SOCIAL, AND SYMBOLIC (CULTURAL) 
The Origin .of Man 
15 
Along with Ayres's consumate interest in Thorstein Veblen's social.and. 
economic thought and John Dewey's philosophy of instrumentalism, early in 
..-----------
. ' 1 
lli-s caree--r-he had manifested an interest-m-th--e-oiological origin or·---cman===-,__..._ _ :__ __ ~ 
It would seem that Ayres recognized that an understanding of the biolggical 
evolution of man was the first prerequisite of any social theory about man's 
behavior. This was during a period, circa 1925-1932, when the meaning of . 
Darwin's theory of evolutionary change was still being debated. Veblen and 
' ' . 
Dewey had made it clear in their writings that they were departing from the 
common assumption as to the meaning of evolutionary theory. Far more 
important to them than the "proof" of organic development of the species 
was the social evolution of man. Ayres stated: "For both the essential 
problem was to view human activity, thought and even civilization as the· 
. 2 ' performance of a strangely ingenious species of superape." Ayres's 
interest in this; period turned to Thomas Huxley, whom he thought had a · 
1c. E. Ayres, "The Gospel According to Darwln," The ~ .!_lepublic, LIV 
(March 7, 1928) J c. E. Ayres, "Gog, Magog and Evolution," ~~Republic, 
LII (September 7, 1927), p. 76; Clarence E. Ayres, Science: The False 
Messiah, (1927; rpt. Clifton, N.J.' Augustus M. Kelley Publisii'e'rs, 19'73), 
passim; Clarence E. Ayres, Holier Than ~, ( 1929; rpt. Clifton, . N •. J. 1 · · · 
Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1973), ;eassim; c. E. Ayres, Huxley, (New York a 
W. W, Norton, 1932) • · · · · . · 
2
c1arence Edwin Ayres, "The Gospel of Technology," American ,Philosophy 
Today~ Tomorrow, eds, Horace M. Kallen and Sidney Hook, (1935r rpt. 
Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1968), p. 28, 
16 
more profound interpretation of biological evolution and its implications 
than did Parwin himself • 3 ·· 
There were probably many reasons for this compelling interest in man's 
origin and evolution on the part of A:yres. He had realized very early in 
his writing that man was ~faber as well as homo sapien~. He sought 
s F---
G __ _ 
to find this "cultursJ." emphasis in Darwin and found only a "biologica.l_"---~-----­
explanation of man's origin, This left him dissatisfied, 
Ayres was also subjected to a conditioning process in his religious · 
training, his father being a minister, He had long since determined that 
what was designated as "religious truth" was merely social constructs 
that had been given tra.-"lscendent meanings, He was convinced, that is, 
that religious meanings were institutional meanings, and that only 
instrumental tools served to enhance man's well-being and to meet his 
basic needs. When one reads through Ayres's works, it is a surprise to 
notice the very commanding knowledge he possessed of Biblical lore and 
theological dogma, There appears to be no doubt that he was an avid 
student of the religious "m,isteries" and supposed "certainties." Even 
though he rejected these "institutional solutions" as being irrelevant to 
solving the problems of the secular life, which he accepted as be:ing the 
meaningful life; he wondered, it seems, how the instrumental process or 
technological process succeeded in gaining at the expense of the 
institutional proc.ess?. He knew, along with Veblen,• that the institutional 
process was very strong and cohesive, some even thought it was invincible, 
3Ayres, Huxley, PP• 233-242. 
=-=--. - .. -.-. 
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Ayres's interest in Thomas Huxley's theories concerning biological 
evolution probably occurred as·the result of his father's interest in 
Huxley. At least it appears fro111 the Preface of Huxle;y:, written in 1932, 
· that this was the case, Therefore, after completing his doctoral dissertation 
in 1917 on "The Nature of the Relationship Between Ethics and Economics," 
and having had published Science'& The False Nessiah ( 1927) and Holier !.h.!!! 
Thou (1929), he turned his attention to Thomas HUxley and became one of 
his biographers. 
Ayres was an indefatigable reader. He showed a very avid interest in 
anthropology and science. His interests, as has been pomted out before, 
were kaelidoscopic in nature. He was seeking to find out in this study 
on ~&• or so it seems, how man came to be hmnan. Perhaps another way 
to phrase the problem is as. follows: What are the causal elements in the 
evolutionary process which caused man to be more than animal while still 
being very basically animal in biological make-up? What was. the engine 
of change that propelled man into the center stage of the animal kingdom? 
Most scientists had assumed because of "Darwinism" that man was distinctly 
separated from his animal past only because of his enlarged brain and 
natural selectivity. Ayres was not satisfied with these answers. Was 
biological selectivity the only key to his change or did man exemplit.y a 
quality unknown to other animals in a more distinctive "social sense?" That 
is, was man brutish and aggressive and oniy "slightly" above the primates 
or did h~ manifest differences which made him a superape?4 Was he a unique 
4 Ibid. ' p. 2)6. 
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animal, a social ar~ cultural creation, just as surely as a biological 
species? Is there such an animal, Ayres seemed to be asldng, as_man 
SL.tl.! man? 
Ayres from the beginning, then, was interested· in the philosophical 
as well as sociological questions concerning man. He wondered at the .end 
of his. life tfhether he should be called more " • • • a woUld-be philosopher 
_than . . ·.. a would-be economist."5 
The Nature of .Han 
- --
Ayres was convinced that man was not a "mind" and "body'' dualism. 
Gruchy comments on this aspect of Ayres's thought, "According to Ayres the 
concept of an inner nature underlying man's behavior is a relic of the time 
t.ffien philosophers and social scientists held the view that 'body' and 'mind • are 
separate· entities with mind being more substantial and fundamental than 
·body. "6 kyres represented himself early as a "behaviorist," using 
quotc~tion marks to set this t~rminology off from any particular school of 
psychology and its usage. He intended to signify a basic undex-sta.nding of 
man in uniform terms. Man exhibited " • • • neurons and language mechanisms," 
or "mental and body functions" 7 together and not separately. Dualism is . 
the theory that reality is divided into at least bro ·independent categorie·s. 
Therefore Ayres was opposed to philosophical idealism with its emphasis 
5kj.-res, Hessiah, p. iii. 
6Allan G. Gruchy, Co!ltemporaiT Economic Thought, ( C1.ifton, N.J.: Augustus 
1-1. Kelley, 1972), P• 97. · 
7Ayres, gosE£1• P• 32, 
~ 
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upon man's mind as the "higher" integrator of his humanity, just as he was 
opposed to those who tried to make man "spiritual" and "material'' in a 
separate sense. ·Man was a material organism, albeit a different kind. of 
animal. 
Ayres was convinced, in part, at least, that man stood beyond mere 
animal behavior in the sense that he made decisions and recognized certain 
conseguences. This position was always a part of his "behaviorism" and 
it was to be the springboard toward a break with those social scientists 
he termed, at a later date, to.be "moral agnostics." He said& 
If we now bring mankind once more irito sharp focus in the 
foreground, we can perceive with startling vividness as 
unpleasant factr that men do not all like the sa.m.e things 
·nor hold the same things good. They do, of course, take a 
unanimous satisfaction in "life, liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness." But men are never merely animals. If they 
were, this 1.manimity would be significant. Cattle, also 
have a preference for life; and life for them means plenty 
of grass. But men are unanimous only about life. They do 
11ot all live on the same things by any means. Indeed, they 8 
arrange to stay alive by inconceivably different expedients. 
Ayres was at this time, therefore, facing what was to be a crucial.issue 
for him later, namely, how can man be a prOduct of his natural environment 
and yet progress materially in a variety of ways. At this point, the time 
of his writing Huxley and "The Gospel of Technology," Ayres was convinced 
that there was "• •• no such thing as 'true' culture. Civilization 
itself, in that sense is idolatrous and false,"9 
Ayres had earlier. written about this dilemma of man's desire for 
8.Ayres~ Holier, P• 69. 
91cyres, ~~ p. 26; f!uxle;'l, p. 242. 
H 
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certainty and his frustration at being a "natural" self in these passages: 
Evolution may be unproved, it may remain always "finally" 
inexplicable. It may suggest to some minds the probability 
of an omnipotent propelling force. Nevertheless, the 
descent of man remains the ascent of ape: not of any 
existing ape, to be sure--we are not baboons or orang-
outangst--but the ascent of some nicer ape, some 
sanctified brute, predestined by Omnifetence to be 
our parent, the undoubted anthropoidl 
~~~~~-But---the-om:,-grtrat~intif'.rl:-ectual-d-efici-ency of science :1.s 
that its sweeping generalizations, whetted to a razor-edge 
of precision; nevertheless unfortunately concern realities 
which though they may be spread over the length and breadth 
of the universe are of an order of magnitude which excludes 
them forever from the joys and sorrows of human intercourse. 
Once more be it stated that we are concerned here not with 
inventions and appliances but with scientific "truth." More 
simply, scientific truths are not the truths that make men 
free. They are to~1true, too universal,.too empty of humanity for that. 
Ayres was firmly convinced of two basic facts about man's development in · 
these early works: (1) that man was not a "mind-body" entity but a 
material entity; and (2) science offered no solace for those who "wished" 
for the "verities" and "certainties" of human existence. 
Ey 1932, Ayres had received fromhis exhaustive study of Veblen's 
works, although .inchoately, ·the basic understanding of man 1 s dichotomous 
nature. In a dualistic approach to understanding man, two parts of man. 
are sat over against each other as distinct entities and cannot be bridged, 
whereas in a dichotomous approach to understanding human nature, man is 
one, a singular entity, but there are two aspects. to his wholeness. Perhaps 
10Ayres, Messiah, p. 196. 
11~., P• 218. 
5~~-
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the best descriptive term, but still inadequate, to define this relationship 
is schism. Ayres m-ote about this distinction in his The Th,eory. of 
Economic Progress& 
• • • Our worst confusions have had their origins in 
dualism. 
This difficulty could be resolved if it could be 
8-
R 
~---
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clearly 1.n1derstood that the distinction of~t-=-h~e;__t~e~c_:_hn:_::_o_:_l:..:..:o::...sg"=i=-=c_:_a=l ______ ~--__ _ 
~-----·a"n~d-the ceremonial aspects of or~anized behavior is a 
dichotomy but not a dualism. That·is, it undertakes to 
distinguish two aspects of what is still a. single, · 
continuous activity both aspects of which are present 
at all times. Indeed, they bound and def~ne each other 
as do the obverse and reverse of. a coin. · . 
Thus Ayres eliminated any bifurcation .of human nature and considered man 
to be made up of two asp~ constituting a whole. While man's technological 
activities can be distinguished from his institutional activities for 
purposes of analysis, man is still both and most likely always will bo so. 
Ayres was also convinced that biologically man was a st~ble quality 
and changed little over thousands of years. He wrote, "Biologically, man 
is the same animal he has always been.· He is totally dependent for life 
. . . . 13 . . . . 
upon explo1, tat ion of plants ·and animals .• " But socially he was a creature 
of change,· "The rectuirements of the stomach are one thing. Conditions of 
14 
life are another." So change altered the human outlook throu~h reasoning,. 
12 . . 
c. E. Ayres, The Theorx of Economic Progress, (1944; rpt. New Yorka 
Schocken Books, 1962), p. 101.. · · . · 
13Ayres, Messiah, P• 122. 
14Ibid. 
c...: __ _ 
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"What is not obvious though it is incalcuably important, is the effect of 
change. That effect is mental."l5 
As has been stated before, Ayres admitted in his last published 
16 . 
writing that he had failed to enumerate these two aspects of man, his 
technological industry and his institutional aggrandizement, until he wrote 
his article, "The Gospel of Technolo _," to be included in American 
Philosophy Toda:y and Tomorrow, edited by Horace M. Kallen and Sidney Hook. 
This article was published in 1935. In this article he indicated that the 
human animal was a problem-solving animal with a dedication to "workmanship,'' 
that is, tool-development, and he was also the creator of a never-ending 
production of myths and ceremonies to brace his innumerable insecurities 
with certainties. In this article, he stated, 11 I have denounced institutional 
st~~dards in to!£ as superstitious and debased and have advanced instead the 
materialist-instrumentalist standard because the two are absolutely · 
17 
opposed.'' 
The plan fo1• this chapter is to deal primarily with Ayres's understanding 
of human nature. However, it is impossible to separate this basic dichotomy 
that Ayres used to describe man's nature from the discussion of his 
understanding of the "self." It is the intention of the writer, though, 
to deal more fully with Ayres's basic dichotomy of man's activities in. 
Chapter Three• 
16Ib· .d 
.2..4• pp. iii-xii • 
17 Ayres, ~os~l, p. 4o. 
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. It is clear that Ayres struggled with "three selves" in man, even 
though man was an essential unity. There are clearly levels of abstraction 
in his thought, but he consistently looked upon man as a unity. The three 
"basic selves" he identified were "the biological self," "the social self," 
and "the SYJnbolic or cultural self." It is only in his later works that 
he came to a significant understanding of the "SYJnbolic or cul turual self." 
This understanding may have been concomitant with the same interests of 
anthropologists of the period, especially Alfred L. Kroeber, one of the 
greatest anthropologists America had yet produced. Kroeber believed culture 
to be "super-organic." He did not mean by this that culture created itself, 
It was man-made, or course. But it had an extension beyond the life-span of 
any one .man• It had a partial existence tvhich was of its own character, but, 
it was also obviously directly related to man. Kroeber stated: 
"Superorganic" does not mean nonorganic, or free of organic·· 
influence and causation; nor does it mean that culture is an 
entity independent of organic life in the sense that some 
theologians might assert that there is a soul which is or can 
become independent of the living body. "Superorganic" means 
simply that when we consider culture we are dealing with 
something that is orgaJ}ic but.which must also be viewed as 
something more than organic if it is to be fully intelligible 
to us.18 · 
However, Ayres did not indicate how this change evolved. As his understanding 
of "dichotomy," it may have been incohate for some period. He may have 
gained insight from Goldschmidt, Mills, Parsons, and it is possible, thou!!h 
perhaps less likely, that he knew of the writin~s of Leslie White and 
perhaps George Murdock. At least Ayres was firmly convinced of the life-
18Alfred L. Kroeber, ~thropolo_a& Culture Patterns and Processes, 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1923)~ p. 617-
~---
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process as "ongoing" and an extension of man's symbolic activity. 19 
The Biological Self 
The major interest of Ayres in his early period, circa 1925-1940, 
centered upon evolutionary and technological change, As noted above, Ayres 
was both a materialist and a behaviorist; therefore he was attemptin~ to 
discover how technological activity (man's tools and machines) changed man 
and why "Darwinism" was more comprehensive in theory than Charles Darwin's 
. Origin of the Species. The natur.e of man was more than an evolved organism, 
and more than an acquired biological self, ·· To be sure ~o saniens was a 
part of nature, irrevocably so, but this was not the be all and end all. 
His biological status was essential to his becoming man, but there was 
another ingredient 'Which coexisted with his natural endowment and that was 
his social development. 
Darwin was certainly right in ~Aintaining that man could not have 
arrived except through a process of mutation, seiection, adaptation, and 
. species orientation, but Ayres was seeking the main "triggering mechanism" 
. to man's total soc~al change, Ayres saw clearly in his biography of Huxley 
written in 1932 what the essential ingredient must be: it was the social 
·activity of man that raised him to the level of "superape." First, Darwin 
was not the author of "Darwinism" or the originator of evolutionary 
development. It had its roots as far back as Greek philosophy~·· Darwin's 
"unique scientific contribution to evolutionary theory was a series of 
formulas, natural selection, pangenesis, sexual selection and so on by 
------
19see C. E. Ayres, !2;.·m.rd A Reason .. ~.bl.~ §.SH!iet;y:, (Austin, Texas: 
University of Texas Press, 19b1), pp. 31-35. 
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which he sought to resolve the enigma of how development takes place.". 
Secondly, he thinks that Huxley may be as much the author of "DarWinism" as 
Charles Darwin, ~nd stated, "In particular, I believe that Huxley 'created' 
the theory of human descent from anthropoid stock as definitely as any man 
ever creates anything."21 Thirdly, the basis on which he could make this 
statement was, he was sure, that Huxley saw the social connections of man's 
evolvement in a singularly distinctive sense and that Charles Darwin did 
nota 
I think a detailed comparison of Darwin's and Huxley's published 
works would indicate very clearly that Darwin's interest focused 
from first to last upon the biological mechanisms by virtue of · 
which development takes place, whereas Huxley's interest from first. 
to last was focused upon man, man's relation to the anthropoids 
and the significance of that relationship for the integration of 
all things human. As everyone knows, ~ Origin of the Species 
mentions the hum.an species only o~ze and then on the penultimate 
page and with complete vagueness. 
What Darwin did was to stop short in his inquiry as to what made man 
human. He was content to rest his case with natural ascent and descent. 
Huxley, on the other hand, rested his case on social ascenta 
"What is it," he said, "that constitutes and makes man what 
he .is? What is it but his power of language which distin~ishes 
man from the whole of the brute world? I say that this functional 
difference is vast, unfathomable, and truly infinite in its 
consequences; and I say at the same time, that it may depend 
upon structural differences which shall be absolutely inappreciable 
to us without present means of investigation •••• But a race 
of dumb men, deprived of all communication with those who could 
speak, would be little indeed removed from brutes. And the moral 
and intellectual difference between them and ourselves would be 
practically infinite though the naturalist should not be able2~o f~nda single shadow of even specific structural difference." . 
20 Ayres, 
2" . 6 
-
4Ib~d. t P• 2) o 
p. 2)5. 
23Ayres, ~~ey, pp. 240-241. 
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.Here Ayres sounds very much like Benjamin Lee Whorf, who believes that 
language actually "constructs" reality by conditionin€!' the very social 
messages that are "coded" into culture.24 
For Ayres, Huxley was the author of "Darwinism" and the interpreter of 
the theory of evolution because he understood the implications of social 
processes, processes in which man makes his own meanings and works out his 
own problems through language. It was only later, and gradually at that, 
that Ayres was to. see fully the meaning of culture and the symbolic process, 
however. 
The Social Self · · 
In "The Gospel of Technology," Ayres labored to indicate his "behavior-
istic" approach to hUlTlan development. He was not limiting himself, he stated, 
to schools of psychological orientation but was extend:tn~ the concept in 
important ways. He was cognizant that even among social scientists a 
wider definition was sought. It was not only biological behaviorism that 
he sought to identify but social behaviorism as well~ But he recognized 
full well that "behaviorism represents the whole trend of modern psychology, 
which has been without any important exception toward the correlation of 
behavior mechanisms with the organic structures on one side and the culture 
traits of civilization on the other. "25 The mystery of the self is thus 
demystified and denaturalized when both biological development and social 
development coexist& 
24 . 
Benjamin Lee Whorf, ~anguage, Thought, and Reality, (New York: Wiley, 
194o) t .£?:SSim. 
25 Ayres, Gos~l, p. )4. : 
:s 
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How important this synthesis is we can easily demonst~ate 
by an experimental dissociation. If we imagine the study of 
all.the ·organic functions of the human body to have been 
brought to its present pitch·or higher by men totally ignorant 
of civilization's past and even present., it is obvious that 
they would be quite unable to account for human behavior 
27 
n 
~·--- -------
·mechanisms; and if we imagine a very full and complete stock 
of anthropological lore to have been accumulated by men 
wholly uninformed in anatomy and physiolo~, it is equally 
obvious that they would be at a complete loss to account for 
the continuity of the behavior patterns so completelyrecorded 
~--~~--------~~----%-----------c--~by-trrEfil·-dat~Botn man anacJ.viTization are intelligible 
only when the two6are regarded as obverse and reverse of the . same phenomenon. Z · . . . 
Yet Ayres was not nearly as clear in these assessments as was to be 
the case in his later writings. In both The Theory of Economic Progress 
(1944) and The Industrial Econo~ (1952), he was to bring his reasoning 
about the social self into sharper focus, and finally in Toward!. Reasonable 
£.ociety, to re.ach what this writer considers to be a remarkable synthesis, 
a representative sociological-anthropological synthesis, one that parallels 
'27 
the social thought of George Herbert Mead and the anthropological 
28 
thought of Leslie A. White. 
Ayres in· his earlier writings had stated, "The weakness of evolution 
in Darwin's time--and· this is still its weak:ness~-was the absence of any 
. 29 
sound clue to the forces which bring about modifications of the species." 
He had in the beginning a rather incomplete notion as to the place of society 
26Ibid., P• )4. 
27
see George Herbert Mead, On Social Psycholcif:, ed. Anselm Strauss, 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956~ 
28Leslie A. White, The Evolution of Culture, (Ne~ York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Co., 1959); Th~ SCience of Culture, (New Yorkt Grove Press, Inc,, 1949). 
29 Ayres, Theor.z, p. 93. 
:i 
- ---------------
as the engine of change vis.! vis "civilization," i.e., "culture." But he 
. . . 
had a much clearer notion of technology, industrial forces, and the 
"workmanship of civilization" as the sources of change, He knew that 
· significant changes occurred with the development of tools and the 
industrial revolution,· But as would be evident in his later works, after 
194o, he began to see what ~e~ had anticipated, that is, ho~1 both man's 
tools and his cultural creations served as. the agents of change, together 
and originally. One must surmise that his continued interest in Veblen, 
Dewey, anthropology, sociology, psychology~ · economics and history brought 
. . . . 
this fusion into greater perspective •. Iri Ayres's middle writings, The 
~ . .· . -- -
Theorx_ of Economic Pro~n"ess and The Industrial Economy.~ he maintaj.ned that 
man was "wholly organic and wholly social. "30 Ayres never deviated from 
his recognition that man was a social product, but his understanding of 
. cultural and social meanings were now emerging into clearer focus, 
Ayres showed a familiarity wi~~ the writings of Charles Horton Cooley 
and quoted Cooley's social theory that.no.person can exist separate from 
other persons,31 It is a peculiarity in Ayres's development that he often 
fails to explain the social theories of .other contributing scholars in 
detail. Here he failed to go ahead and enumerate Cooley's theory of the 
theory of the "Looking Glass Self." 'I'his theory would have comported well 
with his emphasis upon the social self. The concept of the self, according 
30 Ayres, Theory, P•. 93. 
31 
. Ayres, Theory, p. 91. 
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to Cooley, is one that one builds with the help of others,32 There a~e 
three steps to Cooley's conceptualization of this "social self." F~st§ 
our perception of how we look to others; second, our perception of their 
judgments as to how we look; and third, our feelings about these judgments •. 
It would have seemed pertinent for Ayres to have quoted Cooley more 
extensively on this aspect of the self, but he seems to have been far more 
interested in merely establishing the social relationship than exploring 
it fully. 
At this point, circa 1944, Ayres 1 s interest seemed to have turned 
more to an analysis of cultural factors involved in the making of the 
"self," rather than interpersonal factors. He. now conceived of culture 
in much the same manner as A. L. Kroeber and his emphasis upon the 
"superorganic" nature of culture. 33 He stated, much the same way as 
Kroebez;that culture was "the organized corpus of behavior of which 
economic activity is but a part, is a phenomenon sui ~eneris, It is not 
an epiphenomenon, a result of something else, explicable in other and non-
. ~ . . . . 
cultuzoal terms," Ayres had come to see culture as extrasomatic in its 
nature, But it is in Toward ! Reasonable Society that he emphasized the 
.. symbolic self" in this process. There he made explicit that human 
development was possible only b,y man's use of symbols. Indeed, in this 
work he showed that man and culture emerged together through the symbolic 
32c. H. Cooley, Human NatUre and the Social Order (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1902):-pp, 102-1037---
33A. L. Kroeber, pp, 60-73. 
34Ayres, .Theory, p. 95. 
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process, symbolic tool-activity and extrasomaticextension ofthis activity,35 
Before moving to this emphasis upon the symbolic process, however~ Ayres 
stressed the "social framework" as the agent of change in a new dimension. 
In The Industrial Economy (1952) Ayres stated that the "whole conception 
of the nature of man and of society is now known to pe quite false. Human 
nature as we know it is not antecedent to ~ociety, On the contrary, it: 
is a function of societ~ ... 36 He indicatedsocial conditioning in even 
stronger termsi "It is a truth now recognized by all students of all social 
sciences and as fully established. as any i~tellectual principle can be, that 
in the absence of organized society there could not exist any such being as 
. / 
man, That man and society evolved together; and that human nature is a 
social phenomenon not a biological one."37 
In Toward !. Reasonable Society, Ayres sounded remarkably similar to 
George Herbert Mead, whose theori.es of human interactionism may have been 
familiar to him,38 although he does not make an exter1sive association clear. 
As previously noted, this was one of the weaknesses of JW:res's writing. He 
did not document extensively. Perhaps he thought that it was too 
·"ceremonial" to stoop to such elaboration. But Ayres started to use the 
"symbolic imagery" in a new way, and he musthave derived this 11 concept" 
35 . 
Ayres, Societx, pp. 71-86. 
36c. E.·Ayres, The Industrial Economy (Boston: Houghton-M'lfflin, 1952), 
P• 11 •. 
37Ibid. 
38Ayres, Theor_x, p. 163, n. 6. 
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from other sources, Mead had said, "thinking always takes place by means 
of somesort of symbols,"39 and symbols were seen to be universals, that is, 
recognized without additional elaboration. This is the emphasis Ayres used 
in Toward.!: Reasonable Society. Mead.believed, as is well known, that human 
nature was a process and not an entity. He did not make a "thing" of the 
self. Therefore, the social process for Mead was positive, quite the 
reverse of Sigmund Freud's "superego,'' which inhibited; curbed, or censored 
spOntaneity. He saw the cooperative aspects of man's interaction, the 
"rne" or the outside and objective world making the "I" or inward and 
spontaneous part of the self possible. But the individual was in essence 
social, since both the objective world and the subjective "I" interact to 
form the self. Still, the self was never static; it changed as new 
situations and new experiences occurred. Mead's concept of the self was 
the.self in process. Mead asserted: "No hard-and-fast line can be drawn 
between our own selves and the selves of others, since our own selves exist 
.. 40 
and enter as such into our experience.... So, the "I" really appears 
·experientially as a part of.the "me." 41 
Thus :Head was.dealing with social behavior on one level of abstraction 
in the same sense that Ayres was developing his social theory along at least 
two lines of abstraction. Ayres was wrestling not only with the dichotomous 
nature of man as to "industry" and "myth-making" but also as to the dichotomous 
nature of "symbols" and "culture" as ~utside entities and yet within man as 
symbolic tool-activity. 
39Mead, p. 210. 
40 ~ap P• 227e 
41Thid., P• 31. 
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Mead did not show a great interest in cultural development; I1e was 
more interested in the s~cial psychology of the self or the psychological 
understanding of ·the self in process, not culture as an extrasomatic 
extension of man's activities. He knew that selves were created by a process 
of socialization that included culture, but he did not clearly set forth a 
theory of culture, This is not to say, however, that he did not see society 
as the creator of customs, mores, and institutions. He was certainly fully 
aware.of institutions and society and their place in human development. 
But Mead did not pursue a theory of technological behavio~ as a part of the 
. . ·42 
human process; as a part, that is, of the engine of change. 
Ayres, then, arrived at the same socialization theory as Mead yet with 
even broader implications, He was from the very beginning of his writings 
intet-ested in both the input of society and the creative "workmanship" of 
man. Later he was willing to designate culture a:s one of the basic elements 
in this change and to view it far differently than "civilization" that he had 
used·in his earlier writings. He came to use the concept in the sense of 
"the whole way of life of a people" and "the extension of their symbols and 
artifacts'' beyond the lifetime of a people. He stated& 
Every human being becomes human in the behavioral sense only 
by assimilating such a body of action patterns, At birth he 
is human only in the zoological sense, His body is that of a 
member of our species; but he is utterly incapable of behaving 
as all human beings do (for instance, he is utterly unable to 
communicate langaugewise) until he has learned a set of action 
patterns by virtue of which he is able to participate in the 
activities of a cammunity among whom that set of action patterns 
already pl'evails. 3 
42ill,£. t pp. 249-282. 
43Ayres, ~oc~, pp. ?1-1-... 75. 
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And he elaborated, that the more strongly we absorb the "social mean:i.ngs and 
symbols;" the more sure we are that this is our active self.44 
The difference between Mead's concept of socialization and that of 
Ayres lies in the part tool-behavior played in human development. For Head, 
socialization was symbolic, interpersonal interaction, but for Ayres, it was 
social tool-behaviors "A prime characteristic of the symbolic process is 
its indefinite extensibility."4.5 Tool behavior or the symbolic process 
was both ongoing and iinmediate; it used the past as an engine.of change and 
built.upon it. It created anew to Solve whatever problems became important: 
"So likewise tools and instruments and all the physical apparatus of· 
culturally organized existence, being physical, accumulate and since new· 
and improved tools and apparatus result from combining and refining.of old 
ones, the more there are the greater is the opportunity for still further 
46 development." 
The Symbolic ~ 
It may seem at first glance that there is only a superficial difference 
between the terminology of a social self in the thought of Ayres and that 
of a symbolic self, but this concept became the central delineation of 
meaning which Ayres used to define technological behavior, A tool for Ayres 
meant any symbol or artifact that, whenever used in a prescribed manner, 
has the same observable effect, Ayres stateda "Human thought, like human 
44 
.56. Ibid. t p. 
45Ib"d 
. 2-•t P• 92 • 
46Ibid., P• 93. 
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activity, presents two aspects. In one of these man reasons toolwise from 
cause to effect, and the.product of his reasoning is knowledge, however 
limited, of the tiniformities of nature. Thus rubbing of a bronze lamp 
invariably removes the tarnish and produces a high polish, no matter who 
does it, and no matter what the concomitant circumstances may be. u47 V.lhat 
makes his concept of symbolism more difficult to understand is that he 
juxtaposes the 11 symbolic process" alongside the "cultural process." Ayres 
reasoned a 
What most needs to be stressed in this connection is that 
technology--the tool-using aspect of human behavior--is not 
something separate and distinct from the societal network 9f 
personal relationships~ It permeates all such relationships. 
This is a point of the utmost importance • • • The most serious 
error one can make with regard to human experience, society, 
culture, and all related matters is that of thinking of 
technology as "external," outside us, as aspect of the physical 
envil'onment of individual men and even of societies. In truth 
it is none of these things. All tool-using is social. What 
Adam Smith called "the division of- labor" as defined and required 
by tools--required not in the sense of the exercise of arbitrary 
authority but in the sense that the job in hand can be done only 
by four or more hands working together, hands wnach in the nature 
of the case must belong to two or more persons. • 
At times Ayres used culttire to indicate the symbolic tool process as above, 
. . 49 . 
at times he used culture to indicate the institutional processr and at 
times he used culture to indicate the extension of man's artifacts and 
concepts or symbols, in an extrasomatic sense.5° 
47Ib·d 1 l. , , P• - 29. 
48 ~ .. PP• 77-78. 
49Ibid., PP• 126-127. 
50Ibid., P• 75. 
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Ayres thought of culture along two lines of abstraction, the extrasomatio 
character of physical tools and symbols that have extensibi1ity, and also the 
social process by which culture is absorbed and created. The "symbolic 
process" is a part of man and survives man in an extrasomatic form. Symbols 
were both material and non-material, that is, artifacts and concepts embodied 
in culture. ~yres stated: 
The study of primitive cultures by which all our social thinking 
has been so profoundly affected, involved two distinct orders of 
. data. One .consists of physical objects 1 the tools, weapons, 
accouterments, charms, fetishes, ikons, and all the other 
physical apparatus of life in any given community; and the other 
consists of all the rest of culture of that community. The 
former is called the comml,W.ity's material culture and the latter 
its non-material culture.)1 · 
vlhat is intriguing about the concept of culture as presented by Ayres 
is the juxtaposing of symbolic behavior alongside cultural behavior. He 
believed that conceptual tools were as functional in the progress of man 
as were his physical artifacts and they bore a contextual relationship. 
Ayres stated: "Social theorists have sometimes pondered the question 
which came first, culture or society. -But as knowledge accumulates this 
seems more clearly to be a hen-and-egg conundrum. Clearly culture, defined 
as a body of activity patterns and society, defined as an organized 
community, are aspects of the same phenomenon. The creation of interpersonal 
relationships is a function of culture. •i,;2 
As has been previously stated, Ayres was by no means the first to 
indicate that technology is the prime agent in moving man toward change. 
The writer who appears to come closest to Ayres's understanding of man is 
51 Ibid., p. 78. 
52Ib.d --~-·, pp. 75-76. 
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Leslie A. White. There is every indication that Ayres worked independently 
and White does not give Ayres credit for his thought. White believes that 
man has two main·aspects in his make-up: Technology or tool-making and his 
social side. White believes that man and culture arrived together, because 
man could do what no other animal could, namely, "symbolize." This makes 
him different .H'! kind and not in degree• as Darwin had believed, from all 
other.animals. Man must create physical tools as these are essential to 
his security. For White, though, the physical tools are the basis of his 
symbolizing. Therefore, physical tools not o~~Y provide ~An with security, 
they are dominant in his social arrangements. ~an, according to White, has 
two types of needs: 11 ( 1) those that can be served only by exploi t.ing the 
resources of the external world; and (2) those that can be served by drawing 
. . ~ f upon the resources of the human organism only." Man has two types o 
security.needs, one physical, and one "spiritual" or "interorganismal." 
But White consistently maintains that it is man's physical tools that 
dominate his social meanings. For White, the social behavior of man, the 
sentimental and attitudinal nature of man, and the ideological or philosophical 
production of man result directly from symboling based upon his physical 
tools. 11The technological factor is the basic one; all others are 
dependent upon it."54 In this sense White becomes a technological determinist, 
since man is incapable of "con.ceptualizine:" beyond what his technology 
allows. 
5~i te, Evol~ion, p. 9. 
54Ibi~. • p. 19. 
~ -- ---
>--"------
R 
.!.1~-~==-
---------
37 
There is, therefore, a fundamental difference between Ayres and White, :=:; _____ _ 
R 
Q -
despite s.triking similarities. For Ayres, the symbol is a tool in itself, · 
"' ~==-~=== 
a normative instrument, just as the physical tool is a proven instrument, i' ~ ------
of cqange. But for lfuite the symbol is a reflection on man's physical tools, 
which is a part of his brain direction. Man ca~~ot move beyond what his 
material creations dictate. White makes this causal relationshi _e_xp.,..l,_..i...,c'"'i._.,t.___~-----'---. ___ _ 
in this statement: 
If it be argued that technologies could not exist without 
ideas--and it is of course a matter of empirical observation 
that technologies do not exist apart from ideas--and that 
therefore tools are dependent upon ideas, it may be countered, 
first, that ideas can be significant and effective in the 
maintenance of life only by receiving expression through · 
technological means, and hence are dependent upon them, 
whereas the technological culture is significant directly. 
Secondly, in associations of technologies and ideas, one can 
account for idea systems in terms of technologies, and technol-
ogies can be explained in terms of the physico-chemical, 
mechanical means of adjustment of one material body to . 
another. But if one explains technologies in terms of ideas, 
the ideas are either unexplained or are accountedfor b55 appeal to other ideas, which amounts to the same thing. . 
Ayres used "technology" in a vastly different sense to White, for he 
understood physical tools anq symbolic tools to be reciprocial: 
But in fact we have no warrant for supposing that ideas 
are more real than things. If we approach the problem of 
reality in the full light of our knowled~e of the symbolic 
process, it becomes quite clear that the reality of idea-
symbols, though genuine, is in no sense superior to that of 
things. Symbols are a different order of reality from things, 
but not a "higher" order. If precepts without concepts are 
meaningless, it is likewise true that concepts without precepts 
are blind--which is only Kant's way of saying that symbols 
could not exist Without things any more than man could make 
use of things without symbols. In short, there is only one 
form of knowledge, the knowledge man has.acquired in the 
course of his technological activities, activities in which· 
things and symbols are fruitfully combined. Apart from 
th t . . t. b 1 1 d nl t "11. . 56 ose ac· l.Vl. 1.es, sym o s ea o y o 1. us1.on, 
It is diccicult to summarize Ayres's thought on these points relating 
to the "symbolic or cultural" self. There ia a great amount of ambiguity. 
in the levels of abstraction used. Perhaps this must be, as the ideas 
dealt with have a complexity recognized by other writers. 57 It is not 
.._:::: ________ _ 
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difficult to understand where the problem lies. The difficulty is iri 
l--------------~------------'---'~~~-~----.-- --------
presenting a comprehensive view of symboling, culture, society, technology, 
and .tool-behavior. ·A:/res revealed this frustration in a very telling 
sentence: "As I have been saying repeatedly, what we sometimes call 
'human nature, • sometimes 'society, • and sometimes • culture, • has two · 
contrasting aspects. This is no new insight. Throughout the ages · 
·thoughtful men have pictured the human race as drawn one way by white 
horses and another by black. 1158 The difficulty is that these terms indeed 
seem to have a basic relationship in Ayres's thought, but they also stand 
apart and carry other meanings. Ayres might have gone on to state that 
no matter how comprehensive the theory, the process being described seems 
to be lim~ted by its paramount complexity, but he did not. 
The problems Ayres sought to answer are simple enough to enumerate: 
How is culture an internal entity and how is culture extrasomatic? What is 
symboling and how is it a part of the human self? HovT is tool-behavior 
represented both by the creation of physical instruments and by conceptual 
56Ayres, Societ;y, P• 107 • 
.57Howard Becker and Alvin Boskoff, Modern Sociolo&ical 1~eo~; (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart, and vJinston, 19.57), p. 296, . 
58Ayres, Societ_Y-, p. 76. 
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tooJ.s? Are interpersonal relations or human interactions necessary t.o a 
tool-complex? How does the individual function as beth a se1f ·and a 
corporate part of society? What term can you use to sum up this whole 
process of material and non-Dlaterial production on the part of man? 
The term Ayres used to sum up the whole human process was 
"technology," but he knew the parts in the puzzle to be "human nature," 
"society," and "culture." Man was human by virtue of his ability to use 
symbols , by which Ayres meant more than the creation of physical tools; 
the non-material and; normative symbol itself was surely a tool. Symbolic 
tools are not used in isolation; they are socially conceived. The 
"symbolic self" is, in Ayres's social thought, it seems, indisputably· 
related to the "social self," but includes much more than a vast array 
of interpersonal relationships. The "symbolic self" includes man's 
"technical skills" and his "interpersonal skills" in a contextual relation-
ship. The "symbolic self" is so extensive that it probably should be 
described as the "cultural· self," which would include both man's "way of 
life" and ... the extension of his life through technology." 
Summarl 
In presenting a summary of Ayres's thought concerning the human self, 
several stages in his thought must be kept in mind. He was convinced early 
in his career that the distinctive change agents affecting man's self 
were technology and social conditioning. While these distinctions were 
part of AvTes's early writing, he had just started to develop a social 
theory based upon Veblen's "institutionalism" and Dewey's ''instrumentalism." 
f----
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The soc·ial theory that Ayres developed in these formative years placed . 
emphasj.s upon man as a social creation and not fundamentally a biological 
entity. 
The biological self for Ayres was merely a "personal identity," It 
was the constant while society was the variable, He made this distinction 
clearly in Toward !! Reasonable Society, where he stated, "But human 
activities and experiences are always social and cultural, whereas 
'personality' is individual."59 To talk about "biological man," as a 
complete person was a misnomer, according to Ayres. Certainly there is 
a biological part to human nature, just as there is often a known chemical 
basis to physical reality, But biologically, man, while evidencing a 
great variety, is essentially the same as he was fifty thousand years ago 
in structural make-up: · His symbol-using ability has been expanded perhaps, 
as I. Q. may expand throughout the species, but "the fact remains that 
since the advent of·the present species, something like fifty thousand 
years ago, there is no evidence of any change in the brain power of the 
species generally."6o Ayres thus thought "concepts such as 'individualism,' 
'freedom,' 'privacy,' and 'enterprise,' are not only vague; they are 
61 
tendentious and ambiguous." When the conditions of life change, the 
personality changes as wall. There is no such quality as Human Nature 
59 Ayres 
. ' 
Socie,tz, p. 118. 
6o Ibid.' P• 93. 
61 . Ayres, Theo::z, P• 89. 
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spelled in capital letters,62 Ayres found in Thomas Huxley's understanding 
of evolutionary theory the emphasis upon the chart~Se ag·ent that made man 
human, as he stated, "Huxley was right, of course, in declaring that 
science(and we may add industrial technology) began_when man first began 
to pick up sticks and stones and use themas tools."63 
-~----
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In his later works Ayres began to expand his culturological th_e_or_l._·e_s _________ _ 
and to place them within his dichotomous framework. He stated, "There is 
no people and no individual to whom technological competence is not a 
. genuine reality. "64 There is a basic continuity in the symbolic or tool-
using process. It is ongoing because it is problem solving. 65 He affirmed, 
"Tools are of all degrees of generality. · Thin.ldng itself is a tool 
operation; for in the most general sense, the ideas with which men's heads 
are furnished are intellectual tools. How anybody goes about solving any 
problems depends almost altogether upon what ideas (or concepts) which 
are at our disposal that determine the form of the questions we ask." 66 
·Ayres continued to develop two aspects of the self, the basic:dichotorny 
of human enterprise, throughout his life. Technological behavior was 
social, functional, and productive~ albeit never "absolute." Institutional 
behaviot- was irrational, non-productive, and basically wastefu1.67 The 
s-elf- was a complex that was socially conditioned and was tool-using in 
62see discussion in Ayres, Society, p. 120. · 
63Ibid.' p. 92. 
64.Ayres~ Theory, p. 159. 
65Ibid. 
66
.kyres, Econol1}!, pp. 37-38. 
67Ayres, Messiaht p. iv. 
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nature. Culture consisted of both physical tools and conceptual tools. 
"Ceremonial tools" may take on a quasi-technological function, but they 
were never the "real thing." The dynamic change-agent in man is his 
. . 
"symbolic self," which undertakes to solve the basic problems of 1ife. It 
is this process that is or.going--a means-ends-means continuum. 
Ayres's very complex theory about man's "selves" lll{t.kes his social • 
theory attractive from a sociological viewpoint. Many social scientists 
have set forth various change-agents, psychological theories based upon 
.. . 
Freud, interactionist theori~s based upon Mead and Cooley, functionalist 
theories based upon a social-institutional equilibrium, mechanistic and 
behavioristic theories based upon organic causal factors, and technological-
economical theories basedupon.material dominance, but Ayres's social 
thought is comprehensive in that it incorporates the aspects of the "self" 
. into a contextual framework of "biological," "social," and "cultut•al," 
processes. Ayres's theory stands in the mainstream of sociological theory 
in its emphasis upon social and cultural·components in man's development, 
. . 
but it is unique in its emphasis of the two aspec\~ in man, which Ayres 
viewed as a dichotomous whole, tool-behavior and institutional behavior. 
which will be dealt with in detail in the next chapter. 
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CHAPI'ER' THREE. THE DICHOTOMY OF SOCIAL ACTION 1 TECHNOLOGICAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS 
The first step in Ayres's development of his dichotomy of social action 
was taken in Science: The False Messiah (1927). As has been stated before, 
he did not identify the dichotomy as such at this time. But with the 
process, if inchoately. In Science1 The False Messiah, he did not intend 
to depreciate the contribution of science to the ongoing life process, but 
he did "demythologize" science conceived as merely a body of facts. Science 
was a process, that is, the science that Ayres considered to be worthy of 
that title. Reattempted to make this clear: " ••• the facts upon 
wnich science rests turn out to be machines. In the beginning is a 
machine--say, for example, the famous oil drop machine on which minute 
·particles of oil of measurable size are sprayed into a vacuum and certain 
1 
'rays' are allowed to enter." · Thus, science for Ayres, was not fulfilled 
in theory only but also in its application. He agreed with John Dewey that 
life is not merely the knowing but the doing, and so with science, while 
it is represented in the knowing, it should be most interested in the 
doing. The two go together. 
Ayres believed that science could be institutionalized and in that 
sense be "theory" and not "technology," the problem solving aspect of the 
1claren~e E. Ayres, Science1 The False Messiah, (1927; rpt. Clifton, 
N.J.z Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1973), p. 53. 
~-------------
6-
Q- -
2-----~ 
44 
dichotomy. But Ayres conceived of "institution" in a very specific sense, 
a broad sense. The term "institution" did not represent merely social or· 
formal organizations but also functional categories. He stated: 
;:'!-
8--
.___, __ _ 
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. That is, it does not refer merely to the division of the total 
substance of society into its constituent parts. It is, rather 
a functional category. As such it has reference to a certain 
type of social organization or a certain aspect of social 
behavior, which is qualitatively different from another aspect, 
1~------~--------'-!'-e.s-pee-tsc,-one-:in-wl'l.'ieh:_cl.4-:f-f'erent-force-s-are-at-work-t-o~~~-----------c-----c:-. 
different effect from those to be observed in other aspect, or 
aspects of social organization. · · 
There is nothing difficult or subtle about this functional 
distinction. If we proceed directly to the analysis of what 
we will regard as "typical" institutions all possess it in the 
same degree as they possess the quality of institutions. 
One peculiar feature which the "typicai" institutions all 
seem to ··E:xhibit is that of the determination of authority. 
They define the various ranks into which people are divided, 
and the types and degrees of authority that are to be 
exercised by ea~h and of subservience that is to be expected 
. of each • , • • · 
Thus, science could be institutionalized in the sense of a final 
authority but the technological process could not since it was experimental. 
Science .could be institutionalized if it made its "lore" or "dogma" an 
"entity" in itself and irretevant to the ongoing life process. Science, 
the great hope for man, would then be truly the false ~siah, He 
ridiculed its lofty dogmatic authority in these words: "In making their 
case for. science, the modern prophets appeal directly to our credulity 
precisely as Moses did."3 What Ayres intended to imply is found in the 
2 . ) C. E. Ayres, The Industrial Economy (Boston: Houghton-Yrl.fflin, 1952 1 
PP• 42-43~ 
)Ayres, Messiah, p. 43. 
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old Biblical adage, ''By their works you shall know them." It is not by 
faith in a body of facts that the messiah colTies, meanirig the hun1an weJfare, 
but by demonstration~ 
Ayres was perturbed that scientists during the period of the 1920s ~ 
seemed contented to vi'ew science as a bodyof facts without connecting 
their conclusions to the life process. He.was well ,!lWare that scientists 
must lead the way to change, for science ·cannot be mastered by the masses. 
He·stated, "Science can not be the intellectual background .of the common 
. . ,· . .· 
man, and never will be--barring the realization of.that Shavian dream of 
a new race of man who will have the. remarkable faculty of passing on the 
. . 4 
higher mathematics to their progeny like a family resemblance." The 
scientist had an obligation, that is, to be cognizant of the many areas 
of life affected by his work and to set forth by demonstration new paths 
for human progress. The tremendous developments that are freeing men from 
old "myths" are not just scientific formulas but·actual technological 
improvements: 
But this is. only the logical aspect of the case. There is 
also the dramatic. Tremendous changes have come to pass in 
the last few·centuries. We have solved many problems; and 
each solution has left us with a new technique, so that we 
seem to be better equipped for solving others with each 
century and decade. Not only has the chariot of progress 
come thundering down the ages; equipped with the sleeve~ 
valva engine and the counterbalanced crank-shaft, it is now 
:;;~_3tionless at the hig~est speeds, as the advertisement~ 
Even with its enviable position, then, science must play second fiddle 
to the true messiah, the innovation of machines, or tools, skills, technology, 
4Thid., p. 32. 
5Ibid. ' pp. 206-207. 
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or civilization (later to be identified with "culture" but "civilization" 
was the fashionable term at this period).· He maint.ainQd., ••science is the 
handsome Doctor Jekyll; machinery is Hr. Hyde--powerful and rather sinister. 
· Science is the Pentateuch of technology-.;.what we have been given to believe 
. 6 by your new machine-made folkways." Science as fact and theory is not the 
engine of change. Scientists who admire their new-found status should 
realize •• • • • that the driving force behind science is machine technology 
. . 
and they would have understood that maclune technology as a whole, and not 
mereiy the verbal promulgations of scientists, is responsible for the 
disloca ti.ons of European culture. "7 
Later Ayres realized. that science was changing, and he began to see it 
in a new sense. He was always convinced that it was the "thinking" part of 
the "technological" process, and he was fond of using Dewey's description 
of the relationships 
• • • borrowing a figure of speech from John Dewey, I have 
been identifying science as the "thinking" . aspect of the 
tool-using process and technology as the "doing" aspect of 
the same process. Neither :ls possible or conceivable except 
as an aspect of the other. Science advances through and.with 
the advancement of the relevant apparatus (including the 
appa1•atus of. mathematics) and vice. versa. · 
So conceived, science is irrelevant to the whole universe-
of-discourse of messiahship, and vice versa, But in common 
discourse in all languages we employ the term "science" to 
identify not only what scientists (or would be scientists, 
or quasi-scientists, or mock-scientists) do, also what they 
~--with whatever degree of professional authority or . 
intellectual justification. It was, of course, th:is ·aspect 
of "science" whose supposed "messiahship" I was discussin~ 
in this book (Science: The False Messiah).· When I wrote, 
6Ibid., p. 19. 
7Ibid., p. 113. 
~----=--------_ 
2~-==== 
?, 
';-:;~---~--
as tho first "thesis to be nailed to the laboratory door": 
'"i'hat the truth of science is established only by belief, 
after the manner of all folk-lores," I was of course 8 charact~rizing the literature produced by scientists. 
Throughout this work Ayres made these central points over and over 
again, almost ad infinitum. He wrote in another work along the same train 
of thought: 
In tni--s-transformatl.on what we call science is a dynamic ~. 
force not because. of "the power of the idea" but because 
v1hat we call science is one aspect of a much ~:Teater and 
more potent social force: Technology. The rea.son we have 
always found it so difficult to define science satisfactorily 
is that we have taken it out of its cultura1 sett,inp:, made it 
an academic abstraction, and tried.to describe the essence of 
what was in fact a fragment. Science is an activity of 
handling materials with instruments. No line can be made to 
lie between scientific instruments and any other kind of 
machine or tool o:r workmanlike device except whether or not 
the tool or instrument is used to work materials ••••• 
Science can of course be described as a state of mind, but only 
as a state of mind of that activity: The material state of 
mind, the instrumental state of mind.9 
The true scientist is not i.YJterested in public acclaim, as Ayres 
viewed him, but he is interested in experimenting,~ finding out, arid~ 
. demonstrating by continuous inquiry. Facts are to be employed, not 
encased or entombed, Near the end of his ~life Ayres believed that the 
new science 1r1as written much niore appropriately and more in keeping 1rrith 
the life process. "vle are told that the cosmology (if such it bel) of 
Planck, Einstein, Heisenber and their co-workers cannot be set forth in 
language of the multitude, It is totally ir~elevant to the folk-lore of 
8
.f.?id., pp. vi-vii. 
9clarence Edwin Ayres, 11 The Gospel of Technology," in Ameri~ PhiJ osophl 
.1,9.dE;Y.: .~ld To~~ eds. Horace H. Kallen and s~_dney Hook (1935; rpt. 
Freepor.t, N. Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1968), p. 38. 
§_ 
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the past generation and vice ~~· .. io Ayres appreciated this proce$s-posture 
of the new science. EssentiaDy then, Ayres wrote this earlier work as a 
protest against scientists who took themselves too seriously as revealers 
of permanent truths. 
In his later work, Holier Than Thou, Ayres looked upon "institutions" 
as the resisting side of man's technology, Institutions as Ayres conceived 
them were more than material embodiments or social organizations--they were 
attitudes, traditions, patterns of behavior, and established authorities, 
They existed in the social framework of cultural activities just as surely 
as did rocks or trees in nature or automobiles and houses in the physical 
sense. vJhat Ayr.es had learned from Veblen was that this dichotomy of human 
activity, technological-instrumental and institutional-ceremonial, was a 
part of the same matrix and not from different matrices. So even though 
these behavior functions can be separated conceptually for analytical 
purposes, they can never be separated in their common cultural or social 
matrix. This is the meaning of dichotomy, Veblen had seen these two 
aspects of human activity clearly, although he more often talked about 
"workmanship" and "ceremony," than "technology" and "institutional," but the 
. meaning was inescapable, On "institutional behavior,'' Veblen wrote: 
Like all human culture this material civilization is a 
scheme of institutions--institutional fabric and institutional 
grov.-th, But institutions are an outgrowth of habit, The 
grovTth of culture is cuniulative sequence of habituation, and 
the ways and means of it are the habitual response of human 
10Ayres, Messiah, P• viii, 
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nature to exigencies that vary incontinently, cumulatively, 
but with something of a consistent sequence in the cumulative 
variations that go forward , , •11 
Ayres was convinced early in his career that Veblen's "Insti tutio11.alism" 
represented one side of social behavior. He wrote: 
·.What chiefly determines a man's attitude toward alterations 
in the mores is the point at which the social shoe abrades his 
foot. Unhappy couples are more tolerant of divorce than happy 
, .. __ _ 
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people and the professional celibates. Women are more sensitive . . 
to feminism than .men. But most especially, the rich, the powerfult· 
and the successful and even the merely hopeful are vastly more 
concerned to maintain the status quo thim the poor, the helpless 
and those without hope as things stand· at present, We sometimes 
hear the complaint against socialists and communists that they 
are ill-considered men, gauche, greasy and guttural. But what 
do we expect to find social revolutionaries, suave cultured, 
delicately scented men, with oxford accent and ultra-ritzy 
man."'lers? 'rhe poor too, , enjoy their caricatures, They see the 
conservative always as a paunchy man, grossly over-fed, over-
decorated, under-exercised,12 
Ayres believed that the institutional ways of behavior made sense to 
participants even if they were irrational to others. Habit reinforced 
positions in the same sense that symbolization created them. \<lith Veblen, 
Ayres h~ld that "an institution is of the nature of a usage which has 
become axiomatic and indispensable by habituation and general acceptance."13 
. . . . . 
Veblen said in another instances 
, , • an institution is an historical growth with just as much 
of a character of permanence and continuity of transmission as 
is. given it by circumstances out of which it is grown. Any 
institution is a product of habit, or perhaps more accurately 
11 . Thorstein Veblen, The Place of Science in Modern Civilization (;New Yorka 
The Viking Press, 1919)-;-pp. 240-241. - ---
12clarence E, Ayres, Holier Than Thou, (1929; rpt. Clifton,. N. J. 1 
Augustus 1-1. Kelley Publishers, 1973), pp. 223-224, 
13Thorstein Veblen, Absentee Ownershiu ~nd ~usiness Ente!£ris~ in Recent 
'rime~ {New York: R. H. Euebach, Inc., 1923), p. 101 n, 
is abody of habits of thought bearing on a given line of 
conduct, which prevails with such generality and uniformity 
througfzut the group as to have become a matter of common 
sense. . . 
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Ayres was convinced as well about the control of "institutional habit": 
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In the main, the control of morality is secure. Social 
emulation is stronger than the division of the classes. It 
arises from the very character of human herd behavior. In . 
our domesticated life we proceed by habit and tradition, that 
~~~~---~~----------------. 1---------:------;is, by dol.ng as otliers do; and-in spi~e of slight risks here· 
and there, we are a civilization by virtue of that inner 
necessity which impels us all to look in the sap5 direction•- . 
the successful condition--of all righteousness. . .. 
As Ayres developed his theory of value, he became more and more 
convinced that "institutional behavior" was debilitating and·wasteful, a 
position he was to soften somewhat in time. Perhaps he realized it was 
alm·:>st as irreversible in its strength as technology was in motivating 
change. But this woQld be to nullify his central theme that te~;nology 
brings change by overturning the inadequate institutional patterns of 
behavior. This was Ayres's thesis of human. progress which will.be dealt 
with in ·chapter Four. One of,Ayres's most caustic statements about 
institutional behavior is the following: "The whole scheme o~ power-
relationships which we call institutions and usually mistake for civilization 
is savage in origin, depraved in character, and false in thought."16 But 
when he wrote later, he had modified his harshness and had come to accept 
. . 
some aspects of ceremonial or institutional behavior: 
The point is tha.t ceremonial values do not exist in isolation, · 
Always they constitute a system. That system is a quasi-causal 
14Thorstein Veblen,· An Inquig Into the Nature of Peace and !:!'1! Terms 
of its F~etpetuation (New York: The Hacmillan Co., 19~ p. 91. 
15Ayres, Holier, p. 178. 
16 Ayres, Q_ospel, p. 32. 
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system. In or~g1n it is an extrapolation of tool causality 
and hence of uniformities of nature, of which it is a simulacrum. 
Hence the validity of the ceremonial system cannot be asserted 
without indirect assertion of the reality of the technological 
process and the validity of technological values. When social 
scientists assert that values derive solely ~rom the convictions 
. of the peoples who adhere to them, 11hey are necessarily and inevitably asserting the contrary, 
Strassman commenting on this change says, "Another development in. Ayres's 
ceremonial thought and behavior patterns. In the 1940s he cursed. these as 
pure humbug that allowed the strong to exploit the weak, and ·inefficiently 
at that. A decade or two later he came to see that the more numerous weak 
fell for the trick only because ceremonialism was pseudo-technoiop::i.cal. • 
u18 
• • Still, Ayres never conceded too much, for he was firmly convinced 
tha.t ceremonialism could check technological growth and progress, but only 
for a time, and that "institutional behavior" could never be more than a 
simulation of technological-symbolic usage. One of his final statements 
clarified the issue a " • • , some symbolism has operational validity and 
some does not; and if we firmly recognize this basic truth, the relationship. 
between the two orders of simbols then becomes unmistakably clear and the 
enigma resolved,"19 
Basically, Ayres maintained that institutional behavior was founded 
upon tribal legends, upon theological beliefs, social statuses, ceremonial 
inadequacies, ~ustoms, and sentj~ents. Opposed to these were the rational 
17c. E. Ayres, Toward a Reasonable Society (Austin, Texas: University 
of Texas Press, 1961), pp: 133-134. 
1Bw. Paul Strassmann, "Technology: A Culture Trait, a Logical Category 
or Virtue itself?" Journal of Economic Issues, VIII (December, 1974), p. 675, 
19Ayres, Society, p. 31. 
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elements of tool-behavior. But ceremonial behavior is strongly resistant to 
change, and it is greatly irrational. Ayres remarked: "However brilliant 
a young scholar may be and however genuine his contributions to the sum of 
hurnan·knowledge, the.fact that he has not 'taken his doctor's degree' is 
accounted a blemish on his character."20 The authority in insitutionalism 
is vested in superordinates or shamans, "In ceremonial investiture 'mana' 
flows from the person of the chief, just as one 'takes courage' from 
association with persons of superior courage."21 So, "not only does· 
ceremonial behavior determine status by the ritualistic transfer of mystic 
potencies; it does so by virtue of a set of beliefs of which all.'ceremonial 
adequacy' is an expression, or in which the \\thole power-system of status 
and mores finds its supposed justification."22 
Ayres understood,in a progressively more comprehensive fashion that 
the change-agent that could break down institutionalism was technology or 
tool-behavior. Ayres confirmed& "A tool is an artifact which will perform 
to much lhe srune effect whoever wields it, one that anybody can employ. 
A fetish on the other hand, is wholly ineffective in any but consecrated 
hands. Profane hands may whirl the bullroarer in defiance of taboo and 
may produce a noise; but that noise will not summon any spirits. Only when 
the bullroarer is whirled by persons of designated status will mystic 
23 forces respond to its supplication," · The authority for technological 
20c, E. Ayres, The Theory of Economic Progress ( 1944; rpt. New York a 
Shocken Books, 196~ p •. 1.57. 
21Ibid.' 
22Ib.d 
--2:._·, 
PP• 16.5;..166. 
P• 170. 
23~'es, SocietY., p. 13.5. 
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beha,~or is reason, but the authority for ceremonial behavior is force. 
Wheelis, noting this distinction, comments: "Clashes between instrumental 
values seldom invoke violence. Wheelbarrows are alleged better than hand-
barrows, but never has a debate over this issue led to bloodshed. "24 Why 
not? It is simply that when a tool proves more effective, it is used, and 
those who hold out for the old are allowed to go their own way. But as 
Wheelis points out, if the old way were to be institutionalized, that is 
foroedupon others by an outside authority, then the result could very well 
bring hostile or violent repercussions. This would be a clash, not over 
instrumental values, but the authority of institutional values. 25 
The instrumental or technological process is tool-using, experimental, 
temporal, secular, matter-of-fact, and functional. Tools go beyond just 
the life.span of individuals; they have an endless extensibility. Therefore, 
they can be combined in an endless number of "inventions" and "possibilities ... 26 
Ayres did not point·out clearly, however, as others have, namely, Leslie A. 
White and Fred Cottrell, the place of energy and its usage in this 
progression. 27 Both of these writers made explicit that surplus energy was 
essential in the multiplication of physical tools. Cottrell defined surplus 
energy as "the energy available to man in excess of that expended to make 
24Allen vlheelis, The Quest for Identity, (New York: W. W, Norton and 
Company, 1958), p. 1'82. -
25Ibid •• p. 183. 
26Ayres, Societl, pp. 92-93. 
27Leslie A. White, The Evolution of Culture (New York: HcGraw-Hill Book 
Co., 1959), PP• 32-57; Fred Cottrell-;-Energy: and Societ;y: The Relation Between 
Energy: and Social Change and Economic Qevelo:eme_n,1, (New York: IvlcGraw-Hill 
BookCo., Inc., 19.5.5), p. 2-. 
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energy available."28 In a masterful presentation of his thesis, Cottrell 
shows how energy resources can be measured and what levels are necessary for 
countries to have a "high energy" level and what constitutes a "low energy" 
status. White states, "The technological process may be analyzed ••• into 
two components or aspects. On the one hand, we have energy harnessed and 
expanded, and on the other, the mechanical means with which this is 
accomplished."29 Perhaps kyres recognized this important factor in a very 
undeveloped sense,30 but was not interested in pursuing it. It does, however, 
in view of the very lucid treatments by Cottrell and ~~ite, seem to limit 
some of Ayres's comprehension of the climate.for progressive·techno1ogica1 
accomplishments. 
Ayres made clear that combinations occur because of tool progression 
and that this progression is geometrical rather than arithmetical, He 
asserted, "We know with certainty that inventions and discoveries are 
combinations of tools, instruments, instrumentally manipulated materialsJ 
and that the more tools there are, the.greater is the potentiality of 
technical inventions and dis~covery. u 31 Again he stated, " • • , • contrary 
. . 
to popular belief, no knowledge and no art has ever been lost, though any 
one may have disappeared from some particular locality. The creation of 
new patterns does not mean that old ones have been lost, but rather that a 
28 Cottrell, p. 12. 
29White, Evolution, p. 5). 
3°Ayres, Societ~, p. 113. 
3t1Pid., PP• 92-9). 
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32 
new dimension, which extends the possibilities of old ones, has been added." 
Hheeiis added: "The devices which transform man's environment--whether they 
be material, as the automobile, or intellectual, as the differential 
calculus--proliferate by geometric progression. The more tools in existence, 
the more tool-combinations are possible."3.3 
Ayres believed that there was no final authority in the technological 
process except function and efficiency. It is often necessary.to admit 
ignorance because answers are not available. But problem solVing, when it 
does occur, opens up paths for further development and progression. It is 
not retrogressive. It does not look bacla-tards, although it may repeat 
experiments from the past if they are thought to warrant further investigation. 
In other words, this process is flexible and experimental but never static. 
Utllike the institutional process, which does not admit tentativeness but 
rather thrives on certainty and dogma, the instrumental or technological 
process is always seeking new solutions. Ayres noted, "Tool activities 
postUlate a division of labor the sole criterion of which is efficiency, 
. . 34 
whereas the sole criterion of status is ceremonial." There is a continuity 
in the technological process, a basic progressive logic. 35 If one tool is 
adequate, others can result, allowing for other inventions or solutions. 
Thus, "The flow of values in human experience--of ends-j.n-view which in turn 
become means to other ends-in-view--is of course an uninterrupted process,"36 
211. 32Ayres, Theo17, p. 
3~eelis, p, 79! 
"'4 ~ Ayres, Socia~~. p. 136. 
3.5Ibid.' p. 115. 
36Ibid. 
=-··-
. Wheelis shows Ayres's basic reasoning in the progress of the technological 
process in these statements: 
•• The introduction of keels into a culture that contains· 
sails and rudder is likely to yield sailing ships •. The 
. perfection of ail internal combustion engine by a culture that 
contains buggies and kites will certainly res1llt in automobiles 
and airplanes. A historical chart of such devices, therefore, 
has the appearance of a logrithmic graph: The entries become . 
most crowded together as one approaches the present. This 
i------:-~pr-±ne-'.J:Vl-e--d-o-e-s--not-,--o-f--c-oi:.tl"~a:s-s-e-rt--tha--t-trretechnolo g1.cal _-
achievements of 1960 will be more numerous or more signific~t 
than those of 1950; its applicability is to time spans of. 
greater length. Nor does it assert that the technological 
process is an imperative. Coercive institutio~al power may 
retard it, may, indeed bring it to a complete stop, as 
evidenced by thecontinuing existence of stone age culture in 
some parts of the world. Its validity is as a principle 
rather than law. It asserts only that the instrumental pr~7ess 
possesses an inherel"lt dynamic of accelerating progression. 
Junker, elaborating' on Ayres's technological principle, says, "• •• tools 
do not exist alone, they exist within cultures which also contain static 
institutional relationships involving power, class and status. But 
technology is the dynamic force making for change while institutional 
behavior is past and habit oriented. Technology is thus-conceived as the 
master principle for explaining social change--not the only item to be 
taken into consideration but the key principie."JB 
Junker goes on to show that Ayres thought of resources as standing in 
a functional relationship with tools. He said, ''Resources then are always 
in the state of becoming because tools are always in the state of 
development. Resources in this sense are never 'natural' resources, they 
37wheelis, p. 79. 
·38Louis J, Junker, "The Social and Economic Thought of Clarence Ayres," 
(unpubl. Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1962), pp. 94-96. 
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a1~e al1~a.ys defined by tools in conjunction with which it may be used, .. 39 
The combinations which are al1owed in the framework o.f nature were, of 
course, limited to the extent natilre allows, but since this limitation is 
' ' 4o 
beyond our conception, resources may be thought to be virtua11y unlimited. 
One of the most insistent emphases in Ayres's theory of the technological 
or instrumental process is that tool-behavior is universal in nature, He 
continually made the central point that tool-behavior is for all in its 
usage. - It does r1ot- draw invidious distinctions. There is no equivocation. -
It serves not upon the basis of rank or status but upon the basis of its 
functional adequacy, Ayres saids 
• • • • there are two important qualifications to these 
_ developments. One is that technology is no respecter of 
persons. 't•lhat one can do, others can do. The advantage 
enjoyed by the pioneers of industrialization is bound to 
be short-lived as other peoples learn to use machines; 
and in the case of modern weapons, the greater the scale 
the larger the number of persons who must be trained not 
only to the use but a4,~o to the fabrication of the 
instruments of power. 
The point Ayres made is that tool usage itself is cumulative on the very 
basis that the instrumental process does not set up boundaries; it breaks 
them down._ Of coti.rse, the use of the tool may then be institutionalized, as 
in the case of the use of weapons of warfare. But the tool does not create 
the warfare; it is impervious to the destructive consequences of such 
institutional practices. Still, as Dewey made clear, the means employed 
is very much associated with the ends achieved. Dewey stateda 
39Ibid.' p. 96. 
4oAyres, Societ~, p. 113. 
41Ib'd -~·· p. 205. 
--~----------~---·- ·~~---~ -~~- ~--~ --- --
•• • The end-in-view is that particula1~ activity which 
operated as coordinating factor of all other subactivites 
involved, Recognition of the end as coordination or unified 
organization of activities, and of the end-in-view as the 
special activity which is the means of effecting this coor-
dination, does away with any appearance of paradox that seems 
to be attached to the idea of temporal continuum of activazies 
in which each successive state is equally ends and means, 
Ayres maintained that the technological process was cooperative in the 
cooperative. ' 4) Mutual aid is .a basic condition of the technological process," 
He also said, "All people prize tools, and value skill •••• True values 
are trans-cultural--they are the same for all men--because they are all 
interrelated. All are manifestations of the same process, the Jife process 
44 . ' 
of mankind." Technological activity, according to Ayres, was innovative: 
Technological activity continually gives rise to innovations 
resulting from putting together things in new ways by people 
who have no business doing so. Not only do such things happen 
in defiance of the established ways of doing things; quite 
commonly they force the devising of new organizational patterns. 
New positions must be filled for which there are no traditional, 
authentic, hereditary occupants. In short, organizati~nal 
fludity is the sine qua ~ of technological progress. 5 
Ayres recognized that tools must be used in a context, otherwise their 
efficiency would be impaired, But the context becomes more expansive with 
time. Both conceptual or symbolic tools, therefore, along with physical 
42John Dewey, Theor.y of Valuation (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 
1939), P• 50. . 
43Ayres, Societ;y:, p.---1-69 
44Ibid.' p. 167. 
45Ibid. 
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tools progress along a continuum. Ayres once remarked: 
, , • Even today we use sticks to dig with on occasions, 
and (if one had survived) we cou1d take a prehistoric 
digging stick out of its museum cabinet and dig with it 
as its prehistoric maker did. By the same token we have 
better too~g today, and by the same criterion human life 
is better. 
Or again Ayres stated: 
-i-----_______:__--t-~o----o-ne-----wh-o----ha-s--ever------u-sed----a:-tcroi--and-every-'n·uuran-oeing 
- has done so virtually throughout life--has failed to have 
the feeling on countless occasions that the materials he 
- is dealing with are deliberately eluding him. This is not 
a holdover from primitive animism. We are not annoyed with 
our automobiles and our television sets because we learned 
about gremlins at our mothers' knees. The real source of 
our annoyance as we know quite well, is the difficulty of 
the problem--an unexpected difficulty, perhaps, but one 
that is none the less genuine and serious for being unexpected 
· and seemingly trivial. 1·!oreover, this is an experience 
which "brain workers" share with "hand workers," Indeed, 
I put these phrases in quotation marks by way of reco~izing 
that t!1e apparent distinction is quite arbitrary. All hand 
worke.rs are of course brain workers, and vice versa, as their 
common trials themselves sug~est. Everyone who has ever tried 
59 
to hammer out a paragraph knows that nothing is more exasperating 
than the inability to think of the right word to fit a given 
context--the feeling that such a word exists, that it is in 
fact so common as to be virtually in daily use, but that ·at 
the moment when nothing else will do, it is maliciously 
eluding its would-be user.47 
Ayres was convinced, then, that finally the technological process was 
progressive. He saw this process in broad perspectives. He did not 
believe in a "great man" theory of human invention. To be sure, there 
were geniuses, but they along with all others must build on the "foundation 
46J.P.iE•' P• 85. 
47Ibid •• p •. 145. 
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blocks" of cultural experience. Ayres affirmed: 
True values are trans-cultural--they are the same for all 
men--because they are all interrelated. All are manifestations 
of the same process, the life process of mankind. All knowledge 
is related to and conditioned by all. other knowledge, and all 
skills are mutually contributory. Good health, freedom from 
disease and famine, is contributory to the acquisition of skill 
and knowledge; and the growth of knowledge and development of 
skill are contributory to the acquisition of skill and knowledge; 
and the growth of kn@ledge and development of skill are contribu-
~-----tO-~Y'--tG--geGG-hea'l-tJ?..-.~L__ __ .--~--------~-----------~---:--~~~~ 
As 'fheelis understood, the instrumental process takes social unity for 
granted whereas the institutional process seeks to make it ·a dogma. Wheelis 
says, "Continuously and tirelessly institutions assert the existence of a· 
.social entity alone has meaning, arid that an individual life acquires 
significance only by virtue of the individual's findin~ his place and 
identity in this larger whole ... 49 On the other hand, 'Vt'heelis comments on 
the instrumental process in this fashion: 
Divested of all institutional patterns, the life of man would 
portray the organic unity of the instrumental process, the . 
continuity of arts and of technology. This process is one of. 
increasing knowledge and control. . It has no terminus but it 
has direction; and this direction is aw~y from ignorance, 
superstition, cruelty, and helplessness. Individual life has 
value and meaning by virtue of its participation in this 
process. The fact of death, in this view, is reconcilable 
with the activities of life, for a social process of which 
the individual 1vas a part, to which he has contributed, and 
which he can identify, su.rvi ves his individual ext~_nction, 
Indeed, ldthout individual mortality the instrumental process 
could not exist. For if no one died, then no one could be 
born; al'?d growth and development would pass from the experience 
of mankind. The progress of man is thus contin~ent ~pon ~he 
succession of generations.50 · 
48Ibid., J?• 167 •.. 
~eelis, p~ 191. 
5°Ibj_d,, p. 193. 
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Ayres believed that the:r.e were many tools that man could use to 
overcome the institutional resistance. First, there were the physical 
tools themselves, the precision tools. of industry. But Ayres in his later 
· •~itings omitted an earlier phrase that he had used extensively, namely, 
"keeping the machines ·going." He had come to see the need as well for 
social tools, political tools, economic tools, and many other t~~es of 
"control tools." All of these tools must then fU into a proper context. 
As. for economics, Ayres, for example, named four distinct principles: First,· 
it is indivisible and irresistible; second~ it spreads in inverse proportion 
to institutional resistance; third, c~pital is necessary to insure the push 
toward tool-development; and four, education is a must.51 
The superiority of current instrumental tools can only be seen by 
looking backward to view the ineffectiveness of past cultures. But the 
technological process is always forward-looking while "ceremonial behavior" 
remains in its ustatus quo s4nce." ·Ayres stateda 
Because tradition and tradition-grounded values play a large 
part in the lives of all individuals and of all cormnunities, 
it does not follow that all values are tradition:--grounded or 
that· all comrmmi ties and· all human beings are equally tradition-
bound. On the contrary, rigorous .analysis of ceremonial values 
themselves reveals the coexistence at al1 times of another and 
different system of techno1ogically determined values; and the 
experience of the \-lestern peoples during the past few centuries 
(as well as that of other peoples in other times) reveals quite 
unmistakably the progressive displacement of superstitution by 
knowledge and of prejudice by reason. This trend is the hope 
of all mankind. 52 . . 
51Ayres, Theor;x:, pp. xvii-xxv. 
52Ayres, Society, p. 138. 
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Summary 
The first attempt by Ayres to distinguish the "techno1o~ical aspect" 
of humanlife from the "institutional aspect" was to examine the piace of 
science in the technological process. Science was as "instrumental" to the 
process .as one side of a coin is to the other side. Yet science was not the 
summation of the process. Science as a matter of fact could, under certain 
circumstances, become the opposite of the technological process when it 
became institutionalized. However, Ayres saw over a longer period of time 
that science was more process-oriented, and he was pleased with this modern 
stance. Science, then, was one side of the technological proce~s, the 
thinking side, just as technology was the doing side• · 
For Ayres, the basic thrust of the "institutional process" was negative 
to human improvement, albeit a very recognizable part of man's make-up. 
Institutional values were not based upon experimentation or functional 
efficiency but upon ceremony and authority. Man falsely believes in one 
aspect of his.life-activity that security comes through such "truths." But 
the basic security of mankind, his well-being, lies elsewhere, according to 
Ayres. The tooi-process solves problems by the use of efficient and 
functional tools, conceptual and physical. It is judged by performance and 
not by ritual. Therefore, when superior performance is deomonstrated, the 
institutional process gives way. Butinstitutions can resist in a most 
tenacious sense, because they represent the other side of man's nature. 
Sometimes they resist by checking instrumental changes. Sometimes there 
is deception so that the institutional process seems quasi-technologlcal. 
----
·~ -
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But the long history of mankind demonstrates clearly that the institutional 
process can never triumph over the instrumental process. AJTes stated: 
Like the first stone hand-ax, the firzt fire brand and 
articulate speech itself, computerized automation as a 
manj.festation of the technological process. Euman life and 
well-being depends upon the furtherance of that process nol~ 
no less than it did a thousand years ago when (as we have 
lately discovered) the foundations of the indsutrial economy 
was being laid, or a million years ago when mankind was first 
em arking upon its technological adventure. The values we 
seek are those of human life and well-being. The process by 
which we see~3them is an experimental process, as it has always been. · . . . . · 
53Ayres, Messiah, p. xii. 
~ -------
~ 
§ __ 
64 
CHAPTER FOUR. THE UTOPIANISN OF AYRES'S SOCIAL THOUGHT a 
VALUE AND PROGRESS 
The most controversial aspect of Clarence E. Ayres's social thought is 
his contention that "tool behavior" is the locus of all human values and 
that values are measurable through their extension in the life-process 
scientists as "moral agnostics," due to their evasion.of critical judgments 
pertaining to the. most "efficient" and most "effective" values. Their 
consensus that all cultures have a right to value whatever they choose to 
value without outside interference was a capitulation that Ayres believed 
to be intolerable. If values havebeen proven to be "effective," then by 
all means they should be implemented. The whole existence of the human 
race is dependent upon this act of judgment. Ayres stated that the other 
conundrum was only for the "agnostic." "Economic thinking has always 
embodied some conception of progress andmust always do so; for the concept 
. . 
of va1ue :i.s the chief concern of economic thinking, and progress is 
indissociable from value. Agnosticism with re!!ard to value implies 
1 
agnosticism with regard to progress," 
Ayres believed strongly that "technolo~" was another term for 
reason, and that reason affirmed values, and that values meant progress. 
In his introduction to Toward ~ Reasonable Societ~, Ayres stated these 
1c. E. Ayres, The Theory of Economic Progress (1944; rpt. New Yorks 
Schocken Books, 1962):-p:-231." 
~-
conclusions definitively in various key pl"onouncements: 
In a sense I am·writing this book fol" my owri satis-
faction, But the concel."n which has prompted it is shared, 
in oneway or another, by all thout:?htfuJ. people, Is 
industrial society at a dead end, or rushing down a steep 
place into obJ.ivj.on, as so many people seem to fear? 
Committed as we are to a life of l."eason, are we thel"efol."e, 
as both scientists and theologians seem to think, 
spiritually crippled? Is it tl."ue that the modern mind, 
nourished on science, is therefore spiritually sterile7 
~----------~e~a~a our efforts to improve our lot short-circuited 
by the impossibility of knowing in what direction 
improvement lies? Hy answer to these questions is No, 2 
and I am writing this book to try to justif7 that answer. 
Again he said& 
Is it not possible that values derive their meaning and 
their sanction not only from tribal deities, and not 
merely from parochial beliefs, but--at least in considerable 
part--from the human adventure itself, from the quest for 
knowledge and ever more knowledge and from the never-
ending struggle to harness the forces of nature to human 
use? Are there not in all societies two sets of values, 
sacred and profane, so to speak; and is it not the former 
which differ so widely from people to people whereas the 
latter are the same for all?J 
He stated further: 
What is essential is the coninuity of the process by 
which tools and know-how have developed through the ages. 
All peoples have participated in this process. For various 
reasons some have been more "creative" than others, But 
all have been possessed of some modicum of4the knowledge that is inseparable from the use of tools. 
2c. E. Ayres, Joward ~ Rea~onable Scciet~, (Austin, Texasa Univeristy 
of Texas Press, 1951), P• 5. 
J . . Ibid., p. 6. 
4Thid. , P• 7. 
;---------------·--~--···· 
Beyond that, he stated: 
In short, we have here a process in which all peoples have 
participated, which has the same meaning for all, and which 
therefore constitutes a standard of valuation for all. 
Everyone knows what better and worse mean with reference 
to tools, and all peoples judge such "betterness" and 
"worseness" b;y the same standard. These values are the 
same for all.-> 
Finally, he reasoneds 
·we know that supposedly absolute values not only do not 
transcend human experience; they do not even transcend 
the beliefs of the people who imagine them. The real ~ssue 
is whether that is all--whether there is any standard of 
value which has the same meaning for all peoples. That is 
the question to which our present knowledge of the unbroken 
continuity of what we now call science and technology 
throughout the life6process of mankind now gives an affirmative answe1~.. . · 
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Ayres was then led to the belief that "technology" offered the locus 
Of su-oreme value. to mankind, never eternal but far more p!OQTessive than 
customs and :ereferences or "ceremonialism." The "tool process" was never-
ending and "useful to all." It was true in the sense that the ''ceremonial-
process" was not. Thus, he deplored the emphasis of anthropology and social 
science upon "Cultural Relativism."· He called this in essence an evasion~ 
. . 
He could not believe that neutralitywas the·only approach to deal with 
competing value systems. Indeed, values were useful to all, because the 
7 
"tool" was no respecter of persons. 
Ayres admitted quite readily to the plurality of value.s. He made it 
quite clear tha. man is quite obviously susceptible to "ceremonial" mores 
as well as "technological" values. But did this mean that there is no 
5Ibid., p. 8. 
6 Ibid., p. 9. 
7.I~id., p. 205. 
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differe·nce between the two? Were these two "worlds of discourse" to be 
forever separated so that "technology" competed in the physical arrangements 
of man's environment and "mores11 in his value judgments? That is, is there 
basically no difference between a tribal,medicine man and a medical doctor 
specializing in internal medicine? While the doctor specializing in internal 
medicine may not have all the answers, he is certainly equipped with many 
answers which pertain to life and death. These answers work and they work 
on any human person, not just a particular person in a particular culture. 
Thus Ayres believed that there was a 11tility to scientific values. So 
technology is not man's best hope; it is his only genuine hope. 
Ayres was both a critic of absolute moral theories and a critic of 
. absolute neutrality concerning "technological values." He was in truth 
an "ethical cognitivist" as one of his former students clearly maintained& 
Ayres is a persistent critic of the "pestilence of moral 
agnosticism" by which he means radically relativistic theories 
which deny the possibility of attaining an objective knowledge 
of values. He-is equally critical of absolutist moral theories 
rooted in a transcendental or supernatural matrix for, like other 
pragmatists, he objects to "dualism" in all its forms .•••• He 
traces its historical developnent to the philosophy of David Hume 
and hence to its contemporary expression by Alfred J. Ayer, whose 
Language, Truth and logic contains a classic separation of facts 
from values in its distinction between synthetic statements 
(empirically verifiable) and emotive statements (evaluative) 
• • • • Ayres is an ethical cognitivist8because he believes moral choices are essentially objective. 
For Ayres then the idea of progress is not in disrepute; rather it is the 
terminology that suffers a la.ck of credibility. He was conscious that every 
effort must be made to show that progress in its metaphysical sense is 
8Rick Tilman, "Value Theory, Planning, and Reform: Ayres as Incrementalist 
and Utopianp" Journal of Economic I~, VIII, (December, 1974)f pp. 689-690. 
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untenable, but still progress is not entirely relativistic either, It is 
a paradox that "it is the progress of science which has rendered the idea 
of progress itself supposedly untenable."9 What Ayres struggled to 
maintain was an "absoluteness'' in values which were less than metaphysical--
progress meant simply.that the human species benefited unequivocably. It 
might, he·suggested, be very close to the meaning he desired to use the 
term "change," but he rejected the substitution just the same, for it 
diminishe.d the meaning that he sought. He stated furthers . 
When a scientist speaks of the progress of science other 
scientists do not leap up to reproach him having uttered 
nonsense, for the phrase "the progress of science" is not 
nonsense. Neither does it depend for its meaning on any 
preconceived idea of what "the total realization of all 
scier1tific knowledge" might be, The meaning to which such 
a phrase refers is not that of a quantity of knowledge--not 
a finite quantity any more than infinity. It is a ~ocess 
which :i.s now going on and which may quite reasonably be 
conceived as continuing.10 . · 
The focus that Ayres used to defend his thesis of value~-progress due 
to "tool progression"--was one of separatin~ values from both "belief 
systems" and "emotional elements," He believed, nevertheless, that both 
of these factors were a basic part of man's makeup. His thesis was that 
both were subservient to the "real thing." Values that were proven meant 
that people could believe in them and get excited over them, but the 
·"realness" was in neither belief nor emotion but rather in tool demonstration 
and the appropriate applicati(?n for human welfare. In this regard, he 
asked: ''\fuat hope is there for a community whose intellectual leaders 
not only cannot demonstrate the superiority of their 'tl·ay of life over that 
of any other people but have convinced themselves that no such demonstration · 
9Ayres, Theorl, p. 24o. 
10Ibid, 
--------
,. 
is intellectually possible?" 11 On the other hand, Ayres was yery sensitive 
to the prevailing psychological theories which lay stress upon the 
conditioning due to emotional elements in hun1an behaviors 
It is very much more apparent today than it has ever been 
before that irrational impulses and emotional seizures play 
a very considerable part' in human behavior: that the emotional 
experiences of early childhood color the whole of subsequent 
experience; that the process by which animal impulses and 
1,: 
-----
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conventions is extremely subtle and pervasive one; and 
consequently that even our most rational behavior is always 
subject to the suspicion of being a "rationalization" of 
hidden, sublimated, and symbolized emotions, The psycho-
pathologists do not assert that man is the helpless victim 
of his emotions, But their studies do complement those of 
social anthropology in underscoring the signifi.cance of the 
process by which man's emotional nature undergoes social 
conditioning.12 . 
Still, Ayres insisted that while emotional behavior can be deceptive 
and nullify the recognition of values that unite the human species; it is 
also evidenced in activities that provide a sesne of "causal interrelatedness 
that runs through all human activities,"13 Thus, human emotions are both 
"irrational" and "rationai," both ~'ceremonial" and "technological and 
·human," As Ayres stated: 
We know as· well as we know anything that human emotion-
ality is antecedent to all ceremonialism. It originates 
in the organism. The system of culture patterns only 
gives form and.direction to our vital forces. To be sure, 
such shaping of emotional fixation and expressiQR is 
tremendously important: but it is never final.1~ 
11Ayres, Societx, p. 1¥) •. 
12Ibid., P• 83. 
13Ibi.~. f P• 155. 
14Ib.d 
_2._·' P• 159. 
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Ayres recognized full well the cries of alarmists about the state of 
human affairs, a state bent upon destruction rather than human welfare--such 
problems as litter, pollution, weapons for warfare, multiplication of 
automobiles traffic, and industrial waste •. He shrugged these laments off 
as superficial and ill-advised. The very nature of such problems a11owed 
for a climate to exist in which better solutions would be found, He 
summarized: "Unbiased observation should be sufficient to convince anyone 
that the force of moral conviction is just as strong today .as it has ever 
been, not"uithstanding the increasing secularism of Western civilization. ul5 
He concluded: "We do incontestably know.more today about the uniformities 
of nature and the interdependence of all human activities than men have 
ever known before, and we are therefore no less incontestably in a better 
16 position tomake sound judgments ofvalue than men have ever been before," 
'l'he major thrust of Ayres's argument about "technological behavior" then 
is that it is unified because it has value, Allvalues in the plural sense 
must of necessity point toward progress of human well-being if they are 
·"real" values, Ceremonial values are "real" in another sense; they bind 
people through emotive processes and belief-systems. But they are only 
ultimately legitimate in their usage when they represent the ongoing . 
enhancement of the species: 
Falsehoods flourish and are infinitely varied; but all peoples 
mean the same thing by 11 true".and "false11 and all attach the 
same values to both. Among some peoples (ourselves included) 
15Ib.d 
__ J.._,, P• 16o. 
16Ibid,, p. 162. 
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the art of deception is widely practised, and the skilled 
deceiver is greatly admired. But the very meaning of 
deception implies that the truth is known at least·to the 
deceive!"~ and that the victim of the deception j_s victimized 
precisely because truth is great and Nill prevail. It 
prevails because, like the uniformities of nature of which 
it is a frojection in human experience, it is the same for 
all men. 7 . . . 
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Again Ayres is cast in the light of a contextualist, it would seem, 
He desJ.red to sllow t:nar;1-tool operationalism" meant the direction of progress--
the tool gets the job done for all alike. But having i machine that works 
for all does not in itself mean that. you will have the "symbolic values" 
to guarantee continuation of the incentive· for progress. "Tools" can be 
used in a destructuve mariner as well as useful.manner. Thus, Ayres believed 
that "tool-efficiency" was dependent upon a "value-climate." He recognized 
the controversial nature of his arguments when he admitted the "mystery" of 
this juxtaposition. Using Asian, Oceanic, and African peoples as an example, 
·Ayres maintained that "the freedom the Western peoples have achieved is a 
function of the abundance. they enjoy. • • • ••18 Ayres recognized that 
. explanations as to why this occurred were difficult to come by, but it was 
clear, nevertheless, "that the fruits of skill and knowledge are good, 
notwithstanding the dangers they entail, and that the values they signalize 
and foster are all li1terrelated, since they are all functions of scientific 
knowledge and technological competency."19 
.A:yres delineated the values he believed to derive from the·· extension 
17Ibid., p. 167. 
18Ibid., p. 169. 
19Ibid. 
~ . 
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of technology as follows: freedom, equality, security, abundanc~ and other 
"moral" values,20 But Ayres believed that it was impossible to determine 
which came first, the technological process or the value recognition--both 
were joined together in the continuum of the life process. For example, 
in regard to freedom, Ayres stated, "Certainly the most important freedom 
is freedom of the mind; and freedom of mind is both a prior condi~ion to 
invention and discovery and a further consequence of all technological . 
development. "21 In a later assessment, however, he maintained that freedom 
is resultant from the technological process, since the machine does away 
. 22 
with ignoranc~ and poverty. Still, he admitted to the "symbolic nature" 
of such a statement, since freedom is not in any literal sense the result 
of machine invention but rather the result of the process whereby man uses 
23 its production accordingly. This is the freeing aspect, 
Freedom is neither in the possession of the individual nor in the 
control of the community, according to Ayres, but both become a part of the · 
paradox ·when freedom is clearly comprehended. There is no individual in the 
"totality of the life process;" only corporate existence with individuals 
·. . .. ·. 
as a part. For Ayres, freedom mandated restraint. Yet dissent was necessary 
in the total scheme of things or else we would be unable to know who was 
right. lcyres seemed to imply that the greatest complexity demanded the 
greatest variability in order to reach a suitable consensus. Rightly 
20Ibid.' PP• 171-294. 
21,;£bid~, P• 181, 
22loid,, P• 182. 
23Ibid, 
~ - -
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conceived, freedom is one of the cro~ming values, because it sets the limits 
whereby the "progress of the tool process 11 is guaranteed, and it allows the 
individual as a person the access to facts which liberate him from the 
arbitrary controls of the would-be controller. Freedom. means that persons 
are guaranteed the right of inquiry, of combating ignorance, of experimenting, 
and developing. "Freedom does not mean absence of government. To conceive 
it so is to lapse into primitive negativism."24 Ayres seems to have meant 
by this statement that the right of individuals to do their ·~own thing" is 
not freedom at all; rather, implied in freedom is stability for. all, which 
can only come. through complex social organization, that is, ''the freedom of 
government, and j_ndeed of. all the instru.rnentalj.ties of organization, from the 
tyranny of status; operational freedom; constructive freedom; the freedom 
to inquire; and the freedom· to create."25 
As for equalit~, Ayres believed the industrial Western civilization has 
helped us to understand what egalitarianism means. He does not mean that 
individual differenc.es such as those in intelligence, physical attributes, 
or social characteristics are equated, He emphasized the part of urbanization 
in bringing about a bourgeois society and the very term "middle" means 
the accomplishment of a great amount of equality or flexibility--when you 
have but two classes there tends to be domination by the upper-class. The 
reality of mobility, too, allows for a breakdown of class determinism. Unlike 
24Ibid,, p. 185. 
-. 
25Ib'd 
--2:_·, P• 186. 
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caste, class is not binding when the~e is opportunity for mobility, that 
is, a mixed and open class system, Ownership by "management" may-indeed 
seem to bode but ill for egalitarian concepts, but for Ayres such was not 
the case. He maintained that participation in multiple areas of the . 
industrial system p~ovided safeguards for abuses tha.t might otherwise 
occur.26 Ayres admitted that injustices did occur and inequality was a. 
constant threat to an industrial way of life. liowever, despite fumbling 
and vested interests, equality was the thrust of scientifiG enlightenment 
and technological processes. 27 Nor does s~ience lend support to man's 
biological "otherness" as abasic :r:eason.for inequality. There are 
differences, of course, but Ayres maintained that they occur in all segments 
of a society and not uniformly related to any one race or segment, and 
social scientists have learned to pinpoint them and to deal with them.28 
The_social consequences have been recognized as the reason for inequality 
by social scientists, and social consequences can be overcome~ 
Ayres often worked himself into a· quandar>y in defense of his major 
·thesis concerning progress in the "tool process." He argued quite paradox-
ically that everi dictatorships that have sought to possess the ''technological 
process" will in the end find that equality will result. The very process 
will of its own weight break their hold.29 Ayres did not pursue this 
argument, though, since it is obvious that present circumstances do not 
26 Ibid., pp. 187-195. 
27Thid., P• 204. 
28Ibid. 
29Thid.p p. 205. 
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warrant early speculation to this effect. For example, why do not fully 
industrialized countries.such as the USSR move toward full freedom for all? 
Ayres, no doubt,· would have replied, "give them time." At any rate, Ayres 
believed that equality occurred and occurred most conspicuously when the 
"tool" operated in grand ascendancy and when persons were free to let it 
be their master. Then, it indeed worked to the benefit of a11. 30 
· Securi ~ • .Ayres considered to be one of the fundamental values, and 
he was certain ·that greater security had been won for Western civilization 
because of the "tool process." l1yths did not buy us a greater life span 
or more advanced health outlook. Scientific knowledge and superstition 
are not only mutually exclusive, but other quasi-respectable philosophies 
·such as existenialism are just as pernicious, because in the end they only 
seek to provide a hope built upon Wishes, not upon concrete possibilities, 
So llyres remarked of the "tool process" vis !1:. vis "ceremonial claims," 
that "judged by thestandard of actual security, mankind has. done well, and 
31 . 
never better than in modern industrial society." l·lhen people really know 
what science can produce, Ayres was convinced, they choose technological 
solutions; the problem is that so many areas in life are as yet without 
answers or the problems have not been properly defined. Iri this situation, 
people revert to their "ceremonial-behavior patterns." Ayres admitted that 
while tool-behavior provi.ded anst.rers, there was always the perverted usage 
of the "tool." This occurred when it was made a "fetish" and used for the 
30Ibid., P• 206, 
Jlfbid., P• 210. 
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advantage of persons or groups. But he believed that in fact technological 
values n~de people aware'of the falacies of myths and status promoters. He 
stated in utter confidence: "Life itself is becomin~ less ceremonial, less 
a matter of authority and obedience, more responsive to demonstrable facts--
in a word--more rational. I am We'll aware that this judgment is contrary 
to prevailing opinion ... 32 
·The "snap" in Ayres's arguments centers around his viewpoint that change 
occurred mainly in response to the creation of tools, superior tools, and 
that "ceremonies" and "myths" keep men chained to the status quo. So 
indeed our only hope as a htiman race is to keep on changing to cope with 
the new threats to our existence: "The process of efficient organization for 
mutual advantage, by which dawn men first learned to secure themselves 
against the rigors of the winter season, is still going on, and may still 
secure us against the hazard of mutual destruction.")) It appears that this 
is orie of the strongest parts of Ayres's social theory. He showed consis-
tently that changes occurred in societies and cultures not by "belief-
systems" or by "myths," but by means of "tool-intervention." This bei.ng so, 
Ayres believed that it was possible to distinguish between what was useful 
and what was damaging. to the human species. Technology provided a 
"recognizable" standard of what enhanced life am assured human welfare. 
Consistent with his emphasis upon technology as the creator of the 
"good life," Ayres believed in the value of abundance. Claiining economics 
32Ibid., p •. 218. 
33Ibid., p. 227. 
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as his major field of endeavor, this was an emphasis that he constantly 
pursued. ·It is impossible for the present writer to evaluate his contri-
bution in the economic field, much less to assess his acceptance by 
--- ----------
economists. There is no doubt that the school of "Institutionalism" strone:ly 
supported the contribution of Ayres, and he appears to have a strong followin~ 
~ ·-
in the United States, but the "institutionalist approach" is also_:_s_tmngly.____ _ ___c_~~-~~-~ 
challenged and maligned. Harren J. Samuels mentions some salient points 
of "Institutionalism Economics" in an article written in honor of A~es.34 
These were: The growth of the market and economic growth and development· _ 
are dependent upon the extent of institutional organization a~resistance. 
The social and cultural aspects of people is basic to an understanding of 
thei.r economic systems, for economic determination is not merely a legal. 
function or market framework but the whole organizational structure of a 
society. It is, according to "Institutionalists," a holistic operation 
which includes all aspects of a culture. 
There can be no doubt as to Ayres's position on abundance, for he 
believed it central to egalitarian ways of a society, and he thought this. 
to be the "idealn path. For Ayres, then, the key to understanding the 
better way of life was not merely surpluses but also the availability of 
the surpluses for the people. The "old order" or ''conservative economics" 
magnified conservation, "market determination," "hoarding," "free enterprise," 
with some self-interest in mind. The justificatiion of conserving economic 
goods was that the market must be protected. at all costs. The "market" 
3llvlarren J. Samuels, "Introduction: Market, Institutions, and Technology," 
Jour~:_~} of Economic Issues, VIII (December, 1974), pp. 66)-669. 
?8 
and "free enterprtse'' became gods to be matntained, There lvas an emphasis 
upon "ceremonial waste" to keep matters in hand and in control, but 
abundance for all was thought to be the arch enemy of the. market. Ayres 
believed that abundance should be for·all~ not "ceremony" for the 
privileged. He said, ""We do not abhor the waste of .our social superiors 
but tolerate it because of their superiority. In literal truth we regard 
abundance as a heavenly illusion."35 Ayres believed that while it was 
the common assumption that there was no way that good things can be 
available to all, just the revers·e was true-..;namely, good things must be 
available for all to assure greate~ freedom for a11. For Ayres, technology. 
reached beyond the status quo of fear or of privilege and created abundance 
that could be shared for a common good, But Ayres did not believe 
technology should be espoused either because it could provide the food we 
eat, or that food should be consumed because it·is necessary to eat to stay 
alive; rather, both should be seen as a context. He repeated: 
Abundance is not· good in any secondary or derivative 
sense, "merely" because it derives from the technological 
process. Nor is the technological process inherently 
disagreeable in itself but goOd in consequence of producing 
abundance. Both are good because-they are inseparable--from 
each other, and from all other real goods. In a sense 
abundance is the aggregate of all goods and derives its 
goodness from all that is good. But in an equally valid 
sense all other goods derive their meaning from that of 
abundance, since a good is anything we w~uld be better 
off for having more of. Thus abundance carries us back 
to the interrelatedness of all human experience, from 
which the meaning "good'; derives, and it is that inter-
. relatedness 't-Ihich is likewise. manif~gt in the technological 
process .from which abundance fJows •. 
35.Ayres, Society, p. 235. 
36)-bid., P• 246. 
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Ayres defended the excelle~ of Western culture, despite critics to 
the contrary, He was not concerned with raising a.!!.eneration of "purists." 
No generation was ever so "pure" as to reach a "high culture" that was 
beyond challenge. The very diversity present in cultures seemed, rather 
than precluding, to make possible the outreach for excellence. Striving 
for new excellence as well as sharing new forms was basic to the technological 
process. It does not damn a culture to have some forms of art, music, drama, 
and writing available for all. Popular culture and kitsch, therefore, did 
not upset Ayres. He asked in this sense if excellence was really related 
only to rarity or was it indeed more related to expansiveness? As with 
abundance, Ayres perceived expansiveness to lead in part to creative 
·endeavor while still providing some "luxuries" or "good things" to the 
n1asses. He defended "accessibility" as the mark of true technological 
value; at least the opportunity for excellence is ther for all.3? Nor is 
conformity always a burden. He said, "Let us concede at once that the 
mass~communication industries do assail us with egregious mispronunciations, 
outrageous solecisms, and assorted illitercies and vulgarities. Nevertheless, 
the decisive question is, what is the trend?"3B For A-yres, then, the major 
concern was the trend and for him there were no signs of incompetence at 
. 39 
the top. 
37Ibid., 
38Ibi.d. t 
39Ibid., 
P• 254. 
P• 255. 
P•. 256. 
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Thus Ayres defended not only differing standards of art and craftmanship 
but more basically the expansion of "truth." So he maintained: ·~ --
~ 
There is no basis whatever for the indictment of industrial 
society or1 a charge of lack of wisdom. Such a charr,:e can of 
course be brought against particular individuals today as in 
all previous ages. But the vast increase in knowledge which 
industrial society has achieved has not been won at the . 
expense of wisdom, any more than has abundance been achieved 
t-~~~~~~a-"'t--cc·=th=e--cce=xP~. ense of an~h_e~Jn±__oLexc~eJlenc-a,_inc-1-w.B ng~~~~~-~~~~-'-----'-~--~-
individual skill and pride of craft.40 . . 
! . 
Finally, Ayres dealt with anoverall summation of.what might be termed 
peak values. in the "private" or "personal" areas. He believed that in these 
areas too, industrial society brought help and not hindrance. But Ayres 
gave only a scant five pages to such an effort, an effort that seemed almost 
aborted from the beginning. What Ayres seemed to imply was that certain 
"ceremonial" values may.have a specific relationship to known "technological" 
values, and this was not by accident. The very nature of "technological 
inquiry" probably, or so it would seem, mean:t that individual exclusivism 
had to yield to social demands. Efficiency in the lmole human community 
.demanded more than mere self-interest. And efficiency, while compromised, 
'VTas never forsaken . even by those who would go their own way in their many 
pursuits for happiness. 
Ayres maintained that elaborate crermonies about cleanliness have 
been with mankind from the earliest times, and medical and hygienic 
findings have confirmed their appropriateness. Lying is ceremonially 
deplored through the ages, and in modern society you cannot build a 
worthwhile organizational pattern with lying as its cornerstone. Ayres 
4oibi~.' p~ 26o. 
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said: "In short, the simple personal morality of truth-telling is a 
projection of the technical necessities of organized societj_es, and hence 
no clear line can be drawn between the values of individual character and 
41 
those of society at large," As to sexual continence, here too Ayres 
believed there was a need for moderation based upon the need for solidarity 
h==~ ~-
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of human organization, Efficiency, Ayres believed, dep~e~n~d~e~d~u~p~o~n~a~s~o~c1~·a~1~· ----~----~~-----
consensus, but he was also shrewd enough to see that many of these 
standards can only come throu~h "social need" and not through imputation of 
individual moral guilt. He stated: 
It may be that, if a commission of efficiency experts 
were given the task of devising a system of sex behavior 
that·wouJ.d comport with the organizational necessities of 
industrial society, what they would come up with would 
differ from the prevailing ''system" in various respects, 
But it would almost certainly not be entirely different, 
Almost certainly its guiding
4
principle would be a regular-
ization of sexual relations, 2 
As to honesty, Ayres did not believe it was always the best policy when 
considered individually, but he knew it was the best policy wh~n considered 
socially, and he expressed his viewpoint in this manner1 "Honesty is the 
best policy for individuals--not intermittent, but continuous, reliable 
43 honesty--because it is the best policy for societies," 
Ayres summarized his social-individual value bel~efs as follows: 
The same things are true of the intimate, persona1 values 
of "private" life that are true of the ideals to which societies 
dedicate themselves. Ai1 values are fraught with emotion, and 
all values have their traditional, tribal aspects; and since 
the "personal" virtues and vices are those which are so 
identified for us in childhood, that being why we think of 
41Ibid., P• 267. 
1
-I-2Ibid.' P• 269. 
4)Ibid., P• 270. 
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them as personal, they are the values we identify most 
insistently with our tribal mores by reason of the emotional 
conditioning through which tribal mores are transmitted. 
But. it is also true that the effective working relationships 
which constitute the life process of mankind speJ.l out 
values which thus derive not froin our sentiments but from 
our necessities, and this likewise is just as true of the 
va1ues that prevail in intimate personal relationships as 
those which pertain to whole societies. The truth is that 
honesty, decency, and veracity are not only the best policy 
82 
but the only policy in terms of which hum4ftRLJ.-b_e_J.n_· -'g"--s_· _c_a_n_l'l_o_r_k _____ ~-----~~~ t-----------n-II:fietlTe-r~l~ve ootter than the animals. · · 
SUNMARY 
Ayres believed that the "technological process" produced the locus of 
all value for mankind because it moved constantly in the.direction of 
improved human welfare. Reason was the best policy not because it was the 
·only plane on which man lived but rather because it proved its merit by 
efficiency and maintenance. Anthropologists and social scientists in 
attempting to be value-free are in essence striving for the impossible. How 
can society live without judgments? The "technological process" or 
"instrumental process" demands· both thinking and doing. Therefore, judgments 
are vital to the life process. Beyond this, judgments are not of the same 
order. The "tool process" allows for utility but the "ceremonial process" 
makes emotion and preference the key responses. The "tool process" does 
not eliminate ''belief" and "emotion~" for they become a part of and not 
separate from the value of finding "better tools." In reality then, the 
"tool" is supreme because it gurantees man more satisfaction, more security, 
more abundance, more freedom, more excellence, and more truth. This is not 
44Ibid __ , 
83 
to say 'that the "tool" has brought us to the ultimate in our problem:-solving 
ability, for no "tool" has the keys to all .the problems of life. But the 
"tool" is the best process known to man to answer his specific problems of 
existence. Hhile it is never complete, final, or the ultimate, it is 
progressive in its value. The tool process is ongoing then as life is, 
and its utility is proven over the long span of human history. It is 
never static, however, for today's answers will never suffice,.except in a 
cumulative sense, to answer tomorrow's problems. But of one fact Ayres 
was resolutely convinced; the answer of technology was superior to the 
answar·or "emotion," "belief'," and "ceremony," and it alone could provide 
the direction for the preservationof the species. Progress was attainable 
·because the "technological process" was more in evidence in the solving of 
man's innumerable problems. 
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CHAPTER FIVE. CONCLUSIOF AND CRITIQUE: AYRES'S CONTRIBUTIOtT TO THE 
UNDK-{ST.ANDING OF SOCIAL BFYAVICR VS. HIS ABSTRACT UTOPIMHSY. 
REYJA.qDING THE UH.TI1ITED PROGRESS OF TECEl>10IOGICAI VAlUES. 
It is well to repeat iri the conclusion the thesis of this study dea1ing 
with the social thought of Clarence E. Ayres, namely, that although Ayres's 
heory of progress ~s damaging to his sociological--theory as a whole, nis 
. . . 
. . . . 
theory of the basic dichotomy of social action, that of technology and 
ceremonialism, deserves greater credit than it has received and is 
profoundly significant sociologically. 
The major contribution of Ayres to sociological theory, though it has 
not been suitably recognized, is his inclusion of a concept of culture with 
concepts of tec:b...nology, economic "institutionalism," and the nature of the 
self, All of these themes are intertwined into a comprehensive social 
theory. Such a social theory is attractive because of its complexity and 
the range of social facts and considerations it involves. It iS connnon 
enough to have sociological theories presented about social organization · 
and social institutions, to have anthropological theories presented about. 
culture and symbolic behavior, to have economic theories presented about 
market reaction and the price system, and to have psychological theories 
presented about human conditioning and human interaction, but it is rare 
when a writer possesses the scholarly equipment 'to combine these areas into 
a holistic approach, Ayres did not only that, but proceeded to extend 
these approaches and to take into consideration the areas of philosophy 
and ethic~ especially with his keen insight into John Dewey's pragmatism and 
8.5 
instrumentalism. This contrasts with approaches where various social 
disciplines are compartmentalized and where other disciplines are considered 
with suspicion. Such a posture can be the death knell to social science, 
which by its very nature demands the greatest number of alternative 
approaches conceivable. For Ayres, it was inconceivable that science or 
social science could claim to be a "sacred cow." Science meant full 
inquiry as well as full implementation, 
Another contribution of Ayres to social thought was his comprehensive 
interpretation of Thorstein Veblen's works. He showed with erudite 
shrewdness that Veblen was one of-the.. greatest theorists of the twentieth 
century, because he perceived man as partly governed by his "instinct 
of workmanship, 11 an instinct that made technology central to his behavior. 
~l!_ough Ayres was aware of the deficiency of using such unacceptable terms 
as "instinct" as a substitute for "cultural self," he nevertheless realized 
that Veblen, above all others; had found a key to the dichotomy of human 
behavior. Veblen had seen clearly that man's activity was determined by 
his culture and technology just as his other side struggled to maintain 
the status quo through "ceremony" and "pe.cuniary pleasures," "conspicuous 
consumption," and "waste." The change agent was technology, and man to 
improve his life situation was dependent upon his "worklnanship," his 
productive side. 
One of the most forceful presentations of Ayres concerns this 
assumption of technological value. But Ayres's extension of this theory 
of technological efficiency does not depend upon a "reg:i.T!e of workmanship" 
~ -
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as in the case of Veblen but rather upon the assurance th~t the ... tool 
process" ldll continue to gain ascendancy by its own efficiency. The 
''tool" itself, which includes both physical and symbolic tools, has the 
inner dynamic to break down institutional opposition and to bring about 
better human values, 
It was in stu~ying John Dewey's "instrumentalism" that Ayr~e.._.s..__.w._..a...,s~a._...b...,l..,.e,__~-'-~'--~~~~-
to bring his own social thought to fruition. The valuation process was 
known through experimentation and function. Thus, Ayres belteved that 
Dewey supplied the missing link to Veblen's dichotomy of human behavior. 
Dewey in his Theory of Valua.tion1 had seen clearly that values .are of two . 
kinds, those built upon human d~sires and feelings, and those built upon 
logical relationships and pragmatic instruments. As Dewey stated: 
Such rules al"e used as criteria or "norms" for judging the 
value of proposed modes of behavior. The existence of rules 
for valuation of modes of behavior in different fields as 
wise or unwise, economical or extravagant, effective or 
futile, cannot be denied. The problem concerns not their 
existence as general propositions (since every rule of 
action is general)·but whether they express only custom, 
convention, tradition, or are capable of stating relations 
between things as means and other things as consequences, 
which relations are themselves grounded in. empirically 
ascertained and tested existential relations such are 
ususally termed those of cause and effect,2 
Ayres used this touchstone of "instrumental" value developed by Dewey 
as the framework of his social though~. It was possible to answer human 
problems, not because "customs" were logical, but because "instrumental tools" 
1John Dewey, Theo~ of Valuation (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1939), pp. 1- • 
2Thid.' p. 21. 
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we:re. The dichotomy of human nature had a valuating side and man could 
find direction by usin~ this side of his humanity. It was hope for both 
survival and human betterment. But Ayres went much further than Veb1en 
and Dewey in showing that culture is the key concept in the "tool process." 
· In his discussion of culture, Ayres parallels the thought of Leslie 
White, especially in his emphasis upon the development of the symbolic and 
cultural nature of man, and he parallels the thought of George Herbert Mead 
in his emphasis upon the developing social self. But in both cases, he 
offers new theories. He extends the dominance of White's tool usage to 
include "normative tools." He extends the "interactionisni" of Mead to 
· :i;.nc'i\ide- cultural forms of · behavlor along side social forms and social -
institutions. 
Whethe:r Ayres Has interested in particular sociological insights 
developed by particular sociologists is difficult to know. Surely, he 
must have followed with interest the work of his students, c. Wr:i.ght Mills, 
Talcott Parsons, Marion Levy, Walter Goldschmidt, Allen Wheelis, David 
Hamilton, and Rick Tilman. ·But because Ayres was notoriously lax in 
documenting his references, we cannot be sure. He was very independent 
in his judgments and desirous of showing that social thought should and 
was bound to reach beyond "Cultural Relativism." The social sciences above 
all had a responsibility, according to Ayres, to indicate that·man was 
not merely a social animal with no guidance but.his customs but rat~~r 
was a cultural person and possessed a directi<mal purpose. Man was both 
social and cultural--he was both created as a social being and the creator 
~-
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of a cultural progression. And in his cultural role, he was both the creator 
of "ceremonial wastes" and the organizer of progressive "technological values." 
By use of his "technological tools," Ayres believed that mankind could 
asslwe not only survival but also a better quality of life. 
Allen Wheelis used Ayres's conceptual tools in his psychoanalytic 
approach to the problems of human existence. He believed that the main 
problem with value is the quality of the values, an assumption that Ayres 
often put forth. Values do not transcend man, but Wheelis believed that 
neither. are they the result of random and casual activity. Thus, choice 
and judgment is involved in human emotional stability. But, ·Wheelis 
suggests, that when we come to the most important decisions of life, "the 
instrumental process provides no clear~cut answers."3 He states, however, 
that there is usually a basis for a partial answera 
A dozen psychoanalytic liste~~ng to the same case material 
are likely to formulate a dozen different estimations of 
its unconscious meaning, of its prognostic significance, 
and of specific interpretation which should be made. Yet 
they may share the same hypotheses and the same empirical 
approach. There is some common ground, some area of 
"consensual validation," but it is far less extensive than 
psychanalytic literature would suggest. Similar instrumental 
uncertainty exists in all such borderline areas--in marriage 
and child rearing, government and economics, war and peace. 
It is at ,iust such junctures, where the known is interlaced 
With the unknown, that scientific progress takes pJ.ace and · 
the area of the known is extended. It is extended but · 
slowly in those fields where institutional pressure opposes 
each scientific advance; it is extended with accelerating 
velocity inthose areas which are free of such opposing 
pressure. But the awareness of progress provides no present 
answer, and some problems will not wait. One must choose 
.3Allen Wheelis, The Quest for Identity (New York1 · \v. W. Norton and 
Company, Inc., 1958), p. 183.-
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and act. In such circumstances, decisions are apt to be 
made by reference to institutional values. One prays, 
consults dogma, or t•efers--perhaps umdttingly--to mores. 
In psychological terms, the ego ab~dolls the conflict and 
appeals to the superego for a verd~ct. _ 
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\iheelis praises the technologic~l propulsion toward the progressive 
betterment of mankind but also points out some reservations, quite obviously 
dealing with Ayres 1 s strongly worded assurances of 11 technological" 
evaluation. Wheelis did believe that much technological progression was 
hampered by "cultural lag." And he questioned the ''functionalist" model 
in sociology by arguing that it has a tendency to distrust chan!!e: "This_ 
is the basis which has made equilibrium the central concept of social 
studies--the optimum state being 'thought of as equi1ibrium while 
disequilibrium is considered as unrtatural and temporary deviation. "5 
\'iheelis seemingly tempers though the optimism of .Ayres's "technological 
progress." with these conclusionsi 
The instrumental solution calls for the elimination of 
all institutional coercions. Indeed, some instrumentalists 
seem to feel that they only good institutions are, like 
Indians, dead ones. But it is generally recognized now that 
when institutions are overthrovm by force they are replaced, 
not by science,- but by other institutions which may.be more 
restrictive than those which were destroyed. Few persons~ 
therefore, expect a scientific society to be established by 
revolution. But science, it is said, is l·nnning the day, 
and may soon enable us to dispense altogether with myths 
and superstitions as soon as they are generally recognized 
as. such, but there is no indication that we will ever lose 
altogether the potentiality forgreating superstitions in 
the guise of self-evident truth. 
4Ibid., pp. 184-185. 
5Ibid,, PP• 199-200. 
61bid.' p. 205. 
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Ayres was quite perturbed, however, with those who sought to soften 
the thrust of "technological progression." In his review of Fred Cot.trellis 
book, Ener_g;y_ and Society: The Relation Betlveen Energy, Social Change, and 
Economic Development, he chided Cottrell for his "fixation on energy and 
his treatment of energy-conversion as the whole of the tool-using process."7 
He commented further, "By focusing attention upon enercy as a figment. of 
nature and energy-con·version as a natrual process, Cottrell diverts 
attemtion--his own as well as ours--from the process by which knowledge 
grows and skills develop, and by which-accordingly 'energy converters' are 
8 brought into existence in any society ... 
Still, it appears that Ayres's main criticism of Cottrell's approach 
is that it does not sufficiently allow for "guaranteed" technological pro-
gression. Cottrell's book deals with social inhibitors as well as natural 
energy depletions, and Ayres was convinced that these were secondary to 
the fact that technology would lead the way to better techniques regardless 
of social considerations and inhibitors. 9 
One additional comment .seems appropriate regarding Ayres's contribution 
to social theory. It has been the tendency in most of the social sciences 
of late to view with more respect "decision making" or "judgmental stances." 
It seem appraent that Ayres's emphasis upon the "moral agnosticism" of the 
social sciences was ahead of its time. \ihile there are those sociologists 
· 7c. E. Ayres, Review of Fred Cottrell's book, ~nerg;y: and Society: 1.h!. 
Relation Between Energy, Social ~hange, and Economi~ Develo~ent, The 
Southwestern Social Scien~ 9uarterly, (Harch, 1956), p. 4o4. 
8Ibid. 
9Ibid, 
~ 
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1r1ho argue that no value exists except as a social construct, 10 many see 
values as human necessities. Paul Strassman believed that great change 
occurred among social scientists on this issue. He comments: "wben 
economists begin raising questions, anthropologists should take it as a 
cordial welcome to speak up. Fortunately, it appears that, under the 
promptings of George Peter Murdock, A. V. Kidder, Clyde Kluckhohn, and 
~-mnr-crp-orCJgy-b-egan to abandon extreme cUltural relativism during 
. . 11 
the 194os when Ayres was grousing about it." Certainly, many sociologists 
have taken "interpretive" positions, including C. \vright 1"-ilis, Irving 
Louis Horowitz; Alvin Gouldner, Norman Birnbaum, Seymour Lipset, Daniel 
Bell, Robert Nisbet' and Robin I•I. Will.iams, Jr., to name a few.· Strassmann 
makes these comments about Ayres's contributi.on to interpretive social 
thought: 
Perhaps Clarence Ayres was simply a belated nineteenth-
century scientific humanist who bravely skirmished against 
humbug, cruelty, and squalor with original but unqualified 
statements. Perhaps he was simply a displaced philosopher 
1r1ho somehow had strayed into economics and found himself 
defining technology so broadly that he really should have 
called it something else. Perhaps he also did not keep 
abreast sufficiently .with progress among his economic 
colleagues, who while they had not bathed, were at-least 
filling the tub. On the other hand--or at the same time--
he migh~ hayz been a man far ahead of his, and our 
generatJ.on, 
In one sense Ayres's approach to social theory may have seemed too 
modest and too simple for sociologists to consider. Yet, most social 
10A.rm.and l~auss, Sociai Problems as Social Hovements, (liew York: J. B. 
Lippincott Company, 1975), pp. xv-xviii. 
11w. Paul Strassmann, "Technology: A Culture Trait, A logical Category, 
or Virtue Itself7" Journal of Economic Issues, VIII (December, 1974), p. 680. 
12Ibid, P p. 684. 
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systems are built around themes that are woven fugue-like throughout the 
entire fabric. Freud, with all .of his diversity of themes, talked 
essentiaily of aggression and neurotic behavior counterpoised against l-lork 
and love. The vast field of Group Dynamics, w1. th all of its attempts to 
define group interaction, genera11y identifiesbut two basic types of 
groups: (1) those which seek mainly social benefits through interpersonal 
contact; and (2) those which are oriented toward task-solving and problem-
solving. vJhile there are many sociological theories about change, including 
evolutionary theories, nee-evolutionary theories, cyclical theories, 
technological· theories, and others , the tv10 main positions of luterican 
sociologists seem to be of the functionalist or the conflict models. 
Ayres was consistent in pinpointing the dichotQPlY Within man as 
essential to understanding change and man is ability to gain unde1•standing 
as to his best welfare. In doing so, he turned his theme into a multifarious 
number of complex parts. However, his main contention was clear, namely that 
one side of man created "ceremonial pat:terns"· as answers to man's basic 
problems while the other side created "technological and instru.'IT!ental" 
solutions. It was the latter activity that had survival value, while the 
"ceremonial behavior" was counterproductive. 
Ayres did not place the stress on the "waste" of human behavior that 
he did upon the "tool progression" o{ mankind. But he did at least mention 
Veblen's theories .of "conspicuous waste" and "v~carious leisure." He 
mentioned such examples as bric-a-brac, laces, flounces, and furbelows; 
. . 13 
silk hats, walking sticks; luxurious dress and "the Easter Parade•" 
13Ayres, Soc~et~, pp. 201-202. 
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It is evident that Veblen had presented voluminous docUl'Tlentation of this 
side of man's activity, .Ayres seemed much. more intent upon showing the 
"progressive" side of man's behavior, his "tool usage." The central 
thesis of Ayres was persistently evident, namely, that human history shows: 
(1) that change occurs by "technological" means and (2) that man's 
"technology" provides for progress in his problem-solving abilities and 
his search for life-sustaining values. 
vfuile it is to Aires's credit that he explained profoundly the 
dichotomous nature of man, showing that such a concept was basic to an 
understanding of his social and cultural functions, it is the contention 
of this writer that his theory of progress is empirically non-demonstrable. 
·It appears to this writer that "acceleration" would be a more acceptable 
term. Acceleration does not have value-emphasis in the sense of the term 
progress, yet it is not static either; it has a dynamic emphasis. Goldschmidt 
cautions against the use of "progress" as a moral judgment, while still 
allowing "acceler_a tion," in the following remarks: 
Progress is a value-laden term; it assumes certain values or 
goais toward which movement tends. Evolution may be viewed 
as progressive, however, only if these goals are specifically 
defined as the greater complexity of technical knowledge, 
greater capacity to produce, and increased elaboration of the 
body politic in perfonning these ends. They do not imply any 
moral betterment or greater satisfaction or happiness of the 
population. They do involve greater complexity and a higher 
degree of specialization in the means of production, but not 
necessarily any greater increase in indiVidual capacity or 
knowledge or in personal satisfaction of wants. Fundamentally, 
it is technology that1~rogresses; it is man's capacity to produce that evolves. . . 
14wal ter Rochs Goldschmidt, ~ian's li_ax: ~ Preface to t.h~ pnderstandin!! of 
Human Soci;~;y:, (New York: The Hcrld Fublishing Company, 1959), pp. 107-108. 
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Ayres, however, defended a thesis of progress intractably. He did not 
accept an intermediate position of "acceleration" or a context.ualist. position 
that while some empirical judgment of.technological development and efficiency 
could be made other "technological values" are more difficult to assess. 
He believed in the known quality of the "tool" and its values. Social and 
cultural values lorere combined and not treated in a contextual relationship. 
Ayres could state with utter confidencea 
\¥estern science and technology are universally judged to 
be superior to those of all peoples and all earlier cultures, 
and the vlestern standard of living is universally acclaimed • 
not only as good but as the best to which mankind has ever 
attained.15 .· .. . · 
ft.:yres did not state that "technological values" are often the most 
successful man has ever known, or "technological values" can be shown tq 
j be <effective in many areas, or that "technological solutions" reveal an 
"acceleration" throughout human history. For Ayres, the value of the 
"technological tool" was knoWE,, and it was good.· Fol:' him, there was a 
progressive pattern to culture: 
Indeed, the restoration of the concept of progress is one 
of the crying needs of contemporary social science. The 
truth is our·agnosticism has gone .too· far. In ridding our 
minds of the naive collective representations of the past, 
we have gone so far as to deny the intelligibility of any 
sort of pattern in cultural development. The successive 
layers of artifacts which are laid bare by digging of 
archaeologists are not sheer hodge-podge conglomeration~ 
Each successive layer is somehow related to the ones below 
and the ones above, and the relationship ~~ibits some sort 
of continuous process. 1-lhatever the function be called 
.which differentiates one from another, it is a continuous 
function and still differentiats the second layer below.16 
15Ayres, Socia~, p. 51• 
i6c. E. Ayres, The _Theory_ oX: ~nomic F:!:"ogress (1944; rpt. New ~'ork: 
Schocken Books, 19b2'), p. 123. . 
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This statement taken by itself could simply mean that there is evidence that 
man has been able to successfully deal with his environment through a series 
of technological'and social adaptations, and that these developments are 
seen to be continuous. But Ayres stated his viewpoint on this in more 
absolute terms when·he said: "Everyone knows what better and worse [ita1ics 
by Ayrei} mean with reference to tools and all eo le judge such 'betterments' 
and 'worseness' by the same standard. These values are the same for all."17 
This is the crucial problem for interpreting Ayres's theory of progress. 
He does not distinguish between proving the efficiency of physical and 
mechanical tools and proving the efficiency of normative and social values. 
The evaluation is combined. While there may be genera~ agreement as to 
efficiency of mechanical tools, there is wide disagreement about normative 
and social values. 
Strassmann recognized this difficulty in evaluating Ayres's theorJ of 
progress. He questions whether technology as Ayres used it means any less 
than reason itself, and how can you prove rationality by any empirical 
measurement? It is possible to define physical tools and their function, . 
but is it possible to define rationality so that the definition will_ be 
acceptable to all? Strassmann implies that while the parts of an engine 
can be measured precisely, statements about excellence and freedom cannot. 18 
The problem with Ayres's interpretation is his mixing of technological 
function~ with moral worth and personal satisfaction. Thus, it would 
seem Ayres's use of the term "technology" is so all inclusive, so all 
encompassing, as to be amorphous. 
1.7 Ayres, SC2_ciet;z, p. 8. : 
18 Strassmann, pp. 676-677. 
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Furthermore, is it possible to eliminate all institutional behavior as 
being "ceremonial" and "wasteful"? There is at least some proof that various 
cultures meet their social needsby different means; they survive and value 
many and varied traditions. How then can value judgments be made about their 
"institutional" patterns? Goldschmidt presents a more contextualist outJ ook 
than Ayres. He does not posit "cultural relativism" as the only valid 
position of the social sciences, nor does he advocate a moral standard, as 
Ayres does, but rather he supwrts "alternativism." Goldschmidt makes clear 
that acceleration in technical know-how has more often than not been 
recognized to be helpful to man. But he insists on separating value judgments 
of progress from functional possibilities: 
• • • In short, despite those who insist that "what was good 
enough for father is good enough for me," the chances for 
technological innovation to prove itself are relatively good, 
both because its ends are relatively less subject to question 
and because its effects are more amenable to demonstration •• 19 
• 
And Goldschmidt believes that "institutional" behavior is also useful: to 
social organization in varying degrees: 
• • • institutions of .social life are instrumentalities ••• 
they, too, have ends, and ••• some operate bettern than. 
others under particular circumstances. They differ from 
technical aspects of culture in that their instrumental 
character is not self-evident, in that they lack the built-in 
basis for self-evaluation. (The distinction is not so sharp 
as the statement above implies. Hen do make rational, and 
end-oriented choices between alternate institutional patterns.) 
Yet even if there is no self-conscious evaluation on the part 
of the culture bearers with respect to the instrumental aspects 
of their institutions, these end~orien~8d_qualities do render . 
them subject to the selective process. · · 
19Goldschmidt, PP• 113-114. 
20ibid., pp. 121-122. 
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Another problem w:i. th Ayres's theory of progress is the £redicabili t;y of 
"effective" physical tools. It is not possible to guarantee that a "tool11 
which solves.specific problems originally, such as atomic energy in 
providing electrical power, may not in the end work to the detriment of 
mankind. Yet, by using Ayres's criteria, it would be seen as an efficient 
tool and useful for all. This does not indicate "institutional" misuse 
either, such as atomic warfare would be, but an unpredictable consequence 
of an 11 efficient" and "effective" tool. Conversely, it seems conceivable 
that "institutional" tools in many cases create more effective social 
patterns and are not purely "ceremonial." It would appear that. the 
dichotomous nature of man impli~s that "technological values" and 
"institutional values"·are inexorably intertwined and both serve mankind. 
in different ways. This would not p:r-eclude the judgment that "institutional 
values" are far more likely to become "ceremonial" in nature and therefore 
"wasteful." But while there is great variety of opinion about human values--
sociological, cultural, political, economic,, anthropological, historical, .. 
ecological, and so on--there· is in every instance a great amount of consensus 
in societies as to functional "institutional" tools. Without alternativism, 
however, judgment would be unidimensional. 
Ayres seemed to realize that it was impossible to make definitive 
statements cons~J~r.,n,;i.ng moral values, but he insisted that it. 1-1as possible 
to show what was basic. in understanding moral concepts such as freedom, 
equality, security, abundance, and excellence. In so doing, he did make 
value judgments. To consider but one example he used, that of abundance, 
=-- -----~o-----_=--o------=----
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he pronounced it good in itself, and then proceeded to show his reasons for 
s~pporting such a moral designation, The reasons he gave were that abundance 
meant industrial growth, which meant greater amount of goods for all, which 
led to egalitarianism in a society. 21 He believed. that these developments . 
were good for all cultures. Such an assumption overlooks the variety of 
cultural needs, some latent effects of technological acceleration, the 
irreversibility of technological change, and perhaps some psychological 
effects which may result due to misunderstandin~s concernin~ abundance. 
Harvard Sociologist Daniel Bell has expressed concern about American society · 
resulting from its being a land of plenty: 
American capitalism has lost its traditional legitimacy 
which was based on a moral system of reward rooted in a 
Protestant sanctification of work. It has substituted a 
hedonism which promises a material ease and luxury •••• 
the.characteristic style of an industrial society is 
based on the principles of economics and economizing; on 
efficiency, least cost, maximization, optimization, and 
functional rationality. Yet it is at this point that it 
comes into sharpest conflict with cultt~e trends of the 
day. The one emphasizes functional rationality, the other, 
apocalyptic moods, and antirational modes of behavior, It 
is this disjunction Which is the historic crisis of Western 
society. This cultural contradiction in the long run, is 
the de~pest challenge'to the society.22 
But for Ayres abundance was a good in itself. The social context was 
secondary to the value of abundance for all. 
A~es was utopian in his faith in progress. He was optimistic about 
the direction of "technological" change. Ayres did not think that 
"institutional" behavior was a "tool," it was a·substitute, and one that 
21Ayres, ~ociety, pp. 229-248. 
22Daniel Bell, "The Cultural Contradiction, 11 New Yo:rk T:i.Eles, (August 27, 
1970). 
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thw&rted human survival and progress. Conversely, "technological" be:b.avior 
enhanced the chances of human survival and enhanced the quality of life 
itself. The life process showed a cont1.nuum in which the "technolop.:ica.l 
process" paved the way for better human values. 
· It· is the thesis of this study that Ayres would have presented a more 
f""" 
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stand without "dogmatizing" it. The two sides of man would both then be 
seen as tools vital to the selection of values. The "technological" side of 
:man would still be considered as more capable of demonstrated "efficiency," 
the "ceremonial'' side as more vulnerable to "waste." But both -sides would be 
seen as "tool-producing."· Still, the alternativism would remain: neither 
technological values nor social values would stand alone; they would be 
judged with specific ends in mind, "technological efficiency" and "social 
function." 
But to challenge Ayres's utopian theories is not to minimize his 
consistent efforts to show that nian was- basically a dichotomous person. 
While man may be more complex than his social theory envisions, these two· 
sides of man are clearly visible. Few sociological theories make use of 
this dichotomy, hm-rever. It t-Tould be helpful if they would at least 
conside~ it, as they do not where stress is placed mainly upon social 
organization or upon cultural development. Ayres pointed the way to _a 
contextual approach based upon an understanding .-of man's life process. 
Certainly, Ayres could have carried out the presentation of man's "instituo. 
tional" behavior to much greater lengths, but Veblen had done so. He wanted to 
------------
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show man's "technological tools" and their value. Ayres's emphasis upon 
social "control" as the means toward greater human freedom is one that 
deserves study. Present em~~asis is certainly in this direction, although 
techniques for evaluating politicaJ systems is much more complicated than 
Ayres admitted. 
Ayres probably was more eclectic than most social theorists. This may 
be why it is so challenging to analyze his·sopial thought. It is his 
overall presentation of thedichotomous nature of man and not his 
. . . . 
. .· . 
denunciation of "Cultural RelativJ.sm" that s.eems intriguing. \-.'hila he 
believed that "progress" was evide~t .from one side of man, his "technological" 
side, he probably "lOuld have been more in line with dominant sociological 
and anthropological thought had he emphasized the alternativism and 
pluralism of this contextual human activity. His student, Walter Goldschmidt, 
.Probably summarizes this position best& 
The institutions of modern America, like those of all _ 
peoples everywhere, are a product of the past, having their 
sources deep in history, They are·subject to forces that 
change them to fit new situations, both internally and 
externally, But these forces are not merely forces for 
change~ They tend to direct the character of the trans-
formation to·set the pattern and the style of the-trans-
formed society. Whether or not the transformation is 
viable depends upon the accurate calculations_ of those 
who minister to the changes and upon the flexibility of 
the society to make adjustments. 
Such circumstances and such actions have produced the 
evolutionary development of the human condition, raising· -
man to ever greater control of his environment, to ever 
larger aggregates of population, to ever more complex 
social-systems. They have taken place unrecorded and 
unsung in earlier eras; they continue to take place. 
For modern society is not the end product of such 
evolutionary development; it is merely at some stage 
along man's Hay. 23 
23Goldschnrl.dt, p. 236. 
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